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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the participation of
nonprofits in the real estate development process by studying
an actual case. The case is the Doan Center project, a large
mixed use urban redevelopment area in Cleveland, Ohio.
Nonprofits will be examined in terms of the distinctions that
separate them from the public sector and the private sector.
Characteristics of nonprofit participants explored in this
study include motives, objectives, status, assets, and
liabilities as they relate to real estate development. The
Doan Center study is presented from the point of view of a
small nonprofit planning and development entity. The study
also examines the participation of larger nonprofit
institutions. This nonprofit participation in large scale
commercial development projects has become a more common type
of venture in recent years. Both nonprofit institutions and
other nonprofit entities can be very influential because they
have a permanent presence in their cities, often control
large tracts of land, and represent missions directed to the
good of the public.
A general background of the Doan Center project is presented.
Cleveland's economic and political contexts are described to
give the reader a general sense of market conditions. The
current status of the project is then described, as viewed by
its participants. Next, a case study of one project
component is presented. This component illustrates some of
the basic issues of nonprofit participation. These issues
are outlined and analyzed in the following section of the
thesis. The final analysis extracts the major attributes of
nonprofit participation in real estate development. The
broader implications of these attributes for other
nonprofits are described. As real estate ventures with the
nonprofit sector become more prevalent, an understanding of
the complexities involved will prove useful.
Thesis Supervisor: Michael Wheeler
Visiting Professor,
Department of Urban Studies and Planning
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PREFACE
The Doan Center project represents a very difficult
challenge as a real estate development project. The
Cleveland economy was hit hard by the last recession and by
the City's default in 1978. The project area was cited as a
target area critically in need of urban redevelopment. The
project area inherits a history of institutional competition,
neighborhoods which have endured periods of extreme
instability (the Hough area was the site of major race riots
in the late 1960's), and some past image problems of the
Cleveland Clinic as seen by the adjacent community. The
project also has some of the the major assets and strengths
in terms of Cleveland's future. The Clinic is an expanding
medical institution and a major employer. University Circle
holds the city's cultural gems.
The issues brought to light by studying a complex urban
redevelopment project in an economy which is just recently
stabilizing and in some respects still declining, will often
overlap with the overall thesis about the role of nonprofits
in the real estate development process.
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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the
participation of nonprofits in the real estate development
process by studying an actual case. Specific illustrations
found within the Doan Center case will be used to build an
understanding of what distinguishes nonprofit participation
from that of the public sector or private sector. This is
one case and is not meant to be a comprehensive overview of
all nonprofit institutions as players in real estate
projects.
Nonprofit participation in the real estate development
process has many precedents in small scale residential
projects, but fewer in large scale commercial ventures.
Neighborhood based organizations or local community
development corporations are more common than the type of
nonprofit involvement found in the Doan Center case, which
is a large scale mixed use project.
Nonprofits occupy a unique position somewhere between
the public sector and the private sector. Large nonprofit
institutions, like hospitals, universities, and churches,
tend to have large land holdings in cities across the
country. Institutions do not tend to relocate frequently or
easily, and therefore, engage in landbanking as a way to plan
for future expansion. Institutional landholdings can be a
valuable asset depending on the local real estate markets
within which the institutions exist. Recently, these
institutions have been tapping this real estate asset as a
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way to fund their nonprofit missions. In the case of Doan
Center, the institution creates the value for the land,
rather than the local market. In this case, the
institution's desire is to improve, revitalize, and control
its surroundings. Also, in this case, the institution is not
the central nonprofit player. A smaller nonprofit
planning/development entity, called Doan Center, Inc., is the
driving force behind the project.
As nonprofit involvement emerges in large scale
development projects, a better understanding of these players
is required. Nonprofits bring certain characteristics,
motives, assets, and liabilities to the real estate
development process. Understanding the implications of these
factors can be useful to other players who may encounter the
nonprofits as potential partners, landowners, and tenants in
real estate ventures. These nonprofits create a new twist to
the more common public/private partnerships found in many
urban redevelopment projects.
The subject of this thesis is the Doan Center project in
Cleveland, Ohio. The Doan Center site is five miles east of
Downtown Cleveland, adjacent to the University Circle area.
{See Exhibit A} University Circle is a unique concentration
of the major cultural, educational, and medical institutions
in the Cleveland area. One of these institutions, the
Cleveland Clinic Foundation, controls almost half of the
land within the Doan Center area. The Clinic employs 9,000
people, making it the largest single site employer in
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Cleveland. The Clinic also sponsors Doan Center, Inc., a
nonprofit corporation established to coordinate
predevelopment activities for the Doan Center project.
To the extent that elements of the Doan Center project
apply to the overall purpose of this thesis, because the
elements illustrate the role of nonprofits; these elements
will be explored in detail. The project is large, highly
complex, and still in an early phase in its actual
realization. Full detailed information on all aspects of the
project will not be presented. At two points in the project,
detailed reports on stakeholder, market, and physical
analysis were prepared. These reports, prepared first by
Halcyon, Ltd. and later by Enterprise Development Corporation
will be used as reference material.
The thesis is structured in order to give the reader an
understanding of the background and context of the project
first. The Cleveland area has its own unique economic and
political constraints, which are necessary to understand
before Doan Center can be understood. The evolution and
current status of the project, as it exists in 1987, is then
examined. Challenges which face Doan Center are presented.
Next, a case study of one project component, the Euclid Hotel
Project, is used to illustrate an actual attempt at involving
nonprofits with a private developer. Attention is given to
current perceptions of the project, the process, and
potential outcomes.
The next section of the thesis focuses on Doan Center,
Inc., a nonprofit corporation, and analyzes the role of Doan
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Center Inc. in the project, vis-a-vis the other players. To
the extent that the Cleveland Clinic Foundation, as a major
institutional presence, influences Doan Center, Inc., its
participation will be analyzed. The Cleveland Clinic
Foundation represents a nonprofit institution's role, while
DCI is a nonprofit planning/development agency. Again, the
the characteristics, advantages, and disadvantages of
nonprofit involvement in real estate is the subject of this
analysis. Strategies for the future structuring of nonprofit
participation will also be presented.
A final section will explore what implications this case
has for similar nonprofits involved in large scale real
estate development. Speculation will be made about which
issues are and are not applicable to other cases.
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Chapter One
BACKGROUND QA = DOAN CENTER PROJECT
The Doan Center project is a proposed, mixed use, urban
redevelopment master plan for a large area east of Downtown
Cleveland and abutting University Circle. University Circle
is a major complex of educational, cultural, and medical
institutions, in a park-like setting. The Doan Center site
covers about 250 acres and is bounded by Chester Avenue to
the north, Cedar Avenue to the south, E. 79th Street to the
west, and Martin Luther King Jr. Drive to the east. {SEE
EXHIBIT B} Doan Center is more than a physical master plan,
because its objectives include an economic revitalization of
the area. The project's intent is to, "leverage city-wide
benefits from the $500 million institutional investment
program that is now transforming the area." [1]
In terms of location, the Doan Center project also plays
a crucial role in Cleveland's redevelopment. Downtown
Cleveland is five miles to the west and accessed by several
major roads which run through Doan Center. {SEE EXHIBIT C}
These roads in turn link the city to its eastern suburbs.
Euclid Avenue is the central thoroughfare of Doan Center.
Recent planning studies have identified University Circle as
the eastern hub the Euclid Corridor. Downtown is the hub
Cleveland at the Corridor's west end. {SEE EXHIBIT D} As a
link to the University Circle anchor, Doan Center can provide
a critical connection between the Euclid axis, and the roads
which radiate out to the eastern suburbs.
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In addition to the estimated 30,000 employees in the
Doan Center/University Circle area, east side commuters pass
through Doan Center daily. The area attracts an estimated 17
million visitors annually. Students, workers, museum goers,
patients and their families make up this visitor population.
When the visitor population is restricted to outsiders
(museum and medical users), 47,000 people visit the area on a
daily basis. This is about 1/3 the amount that visit
Downtown Cleveland.[2] The ability to attract these visitors
and play off the area's cultural amenities is the potential
the project posesses.
HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF THE LOCATION
Historically, the Doan Center was known as "Doan's
Corners," a center for entertainment and lodgings. The
location experienced the following transformations:
Two hundred years ago, it was a wilderness.
A hundred years ago, it was a thriving
community that had recently been annexed to
Cleveland. Fifty years ago, it was an
entertainment and retailing center.
Twenty-five years ago, it was a haven for
pornography and strip joints.
Now, Doan Center may be on the verge of a
renaissance as a residential and retailing
center near by University Circle, one of the
major cultural centers in the country.[3]
This "renaissance" includes substantial monetary
investment (approximately $500 million) by various
institutions in the area.[4] It also includes a commitment
of leadership, vision, and resources by institutions,
neighborhood groups, and minority leaders to planning the
future of the area.
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The Doan Center project is bounded by four distinct
neighbors. {SEE EXHIBIT E} These neighbors are residential
to the north and south, institutional to the east and
commercial/industrial to the west. Fairfax is a lower
middle income neighborhood to the south of Doan Center.
Fairfax has experienced some disinvestment and deterioration
due to an aging homeowner population and migration to the
suburbs. Hough is a neighborhood located to the north of
Doan Center. Hough experienced major racial unrest in the
1960's and is probably best known for the Hough riots which
took place in 1968. The Hough area has also experienced an
economic decline, but recently has shown great local
initiative in housing redevelopment. To the east of Doan
Center is University Circle, a well landscaped setting for
Cleveland's cultural "gems", such as the Cleveland Museum of
Art and Severance Hall, home of the Cleveland Orchestra.
Case Western Reserve University (CWRU) and its teaching
hospital, University Hospitals are also major institutions in
University Circle. {SEE EXHIBIT F} University Circle, Inc.,
a nonprofit service and development operation with a
membership of 37 institutions, is prominent in the area's
activities. To the west of Doan Center is an area currently
known as the Midtown Corridor. Midtown Corridor is another
planning area similar to Doan Center, but based largely on
business development and revitalization.
Approximately 100 acres in the Doan Center area is owned
by a major medical institution, the Cleveland Clinic
Foundation. {SEE EXHIBIT G} This is less than half of the
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total 250 acres in the project area. After considering
relocation to the suburbs during the 1960's, the Cleveland
Clinic decided to maintain its commitment to a location it
has occupied since its founding in 1921. In 1974, the Clinic
began quietly acquiring property, and piece by piece,
assembled a large tract of urban land. In the 1970's the
Clinic also began to prepare a long range plan for its
needs.[51 Evidence of the Clinic's commitment to its Doan
Center location can be seen by the large amount of Clinic
facilities constructed recently. These include a major
building by world renowned architect, Cesar Pelli. The
Clinic's most recent expansion represents an investment of
about $300 million in its own facilities.[6] Another major
institution within the project boundaries is the Cleveland
Playhouse. The Playhouse recently completed an addition to
its theatre complex, designed by Phillip Johnson, a native
Clevelander.
DOAN CENTER'S ECONOMIC CONTEXT
For purposes of understanding economic trends which
ultimately affect the Doan Center real estate market, one
must look at the area's location relative to the Northeast
Ohio region, Cleveland Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area
(SMSA), City of Cleveland, and Downtown (CBD). Doan Center
is located within the City of Cleveland, but not within the
Downtown area. Doan Center and University Circle are at the
City's eastern boundary. Doan Center is in closer proximity
to the eastern suburb of Cleveland Heights than it is to
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Cleveland's CBD. The Greater Cleveland area or SMSA includes
four counties: Cuyahoga, Lake, Medina, and Geauga. The City
of Cleveland is in Cuyahoga County. The Northeast Ohio
region includes four SMSA's: Cleveland, Akron, Lorain, and
Elyria. {SEE EXHIBIT H). [7)
Economically, the City of Cleveland has been hard hit by
two major trends; migration from the city to the suburbs and
a shift in the national economy from manufacturing to service
sectors. Although employment growth in the Northeast Ohio
region and the Greater Cleveland SMSA is projected to be
static, the City of Cleveland is projected to continue losing
jobs and population. Growth in the Cleveland area's service
sectors will just about offset the tremendous loss in the
manufacturing sector. However, service sector jobs have not
historically paid as well as manufacturing jobs. This fact
implies a decline in Cleveland's income. [8]
A 1981 McKinsey study entitled "Cleveland Tomorrow--A
Strategy for Economic Vitality," described a long term
problem in the Northeast Ohio region's inability to keep pace
with national employment trends or those of other frost belt
cities. From 1967 to 1978, the national employment growth
rate was 33%, and Cleveland's was 12%. The area also lost 6
of its 28 Fortune 1000 corporate headquarters. Chase
Econometrics ranked Cleveland 105 of 108 metropolitan areas
for projected job growth in the 1980's. This study also
points out a problem in Cleveland's limited participation in
growth industries. Cleveland has also failed to be
competitive in attracting federal R & D grant funding to area
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educational institution's. The nonprofit corporation,
Cleveland Tomorrow, was established to define and implement
strategies which would address these problems. [9]
In terms of trends, most areas, including the SMSA
experienced a decline in employment from 1979 to 1983. This
decline was about 10% of total employment. The SMSA has
reversed this decline since 1983, recovering 70,000 of 90,000
jobs lost. SMSA projections are for stability. The City is
projected to continue a decline in employment, losing 40,000
jobs by the year 2000 for a projected total of 300,000 jobs.
Some share of this loss will go to the suburbs. The Downtown
area employment is projected to grow, as this is the location
for most FIRE sector (Financial, Insurance, and Real Estate)
and professional jobs. [10) The one area besides downtown
that did not experience a decline in employment from 1976 and
1984 was the Euclid Corridor. [11] Doan Center is within
this Euclid Corridor area.
Many people in the Cleveland area believe that the worst
is past, in terms of decline, and that while 1979 to 1983 was
a bottoming out, 1983 represented a turning point. Since
1983 rates of decline have slowed or reversed.
The second component of the Cleveland area's economic
context is population. The City is divided into an East Side
and West Side by the Cuyahoga River which flows into Lake
Erie. Doan Center is on Cleveland's East Side. The East
Side has lost population at a far greater rate than the West
Side and this trend is projected to continue. The region of
the city which contains Doan Center is projected to have the
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heaviest population losses. Cleveland is not only losing
households; it is also experiencing a decline in household
size attributed to a lower birth rate and increased number of
senior citizens. This decrease in household size is
projected to level off. The number of households in Cuyahoga
County is expected to grow.[12]
The city of Cleveland has historically been a poor
competitor with its suburbs in terms of attracting residents.
Factors contributing to this are easy accessibility by car
from the suburbs to the city. Roads have the capacity to
carry traffic, and parking is ample. Also, there is not a
large amount of existing housing stock in the immediate
downtown area, so that the city has not experienced
gentrification as some other urban areas have. In downtown
Cleveland, some indigenous revitalization is occurring in an
area called "the Flats" along the river. There is existing
housing stock beyond downtown, and within the city; but this
is older in relation to the suburbs. Housing prices in
general are low compared to other cities. In the last
quarter of 1986, the Median House Price for an existing
single family home in the Cleveland metropolitan area was
$65,100, while Boston's was $167,800.[13] Rents average $450
to $500 in the Doan Center area and $450 to $600 in the
suburbs for a one bedroom suite. Commercial land values
along Euclid Avenue near University Circle were estimated at
$3/SF, although this varies considerably depending on the
exact location.[14]
The City of Cleveland recently undertook a study of
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employment and population trends in the area and region as
part of its CIVIC VISION comprehensive plan. (More detail on
Civic Vision is contained in the following section on
Cleveland's political context.) Prior to Civic Vision, the
city produced a document entitled, "Target Area Investment
Program." This contained an economic development strategy for
an area on Cleveland's east side. {SEE EXHIBIT I} Doan
Center is part of this target area, which the city recognized
as being in dire need of economic revitalization. Doan
Center's surroundings: Midtown Corridor; University Circle;
Hough; and Fairfax were also included in the target area.
{SEE EXHIBIT E} The city hoped this area would become a
federal enterprise zone. [151
Reasons for the attention given to this Target Area and
Doan Center were that the area experienced the greatest rate
of population loss and decline in household income; yet
maintained increasing employment. Fairfax and Hough
experienced some of the greatest rates of population loss
from 1970 to 1980 (42% and 44%).[16] {SEE EXHIBIT J} These
rates have slowed in the 1980's, and are projected to be
about half what they were. This is consistent with
projections for the city as a whole.
Household income in the Doan Center area was 35% of the
typical household income in the county in 1980. Mean
household incomes were projected to stabilize in the City,
and increase in the County. The region within the City which
contains Doan Center was projected to have the City's lowest
mean household incomes by the year 2000. This income was
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projected to be $12,777 in 1985 dollars. (17]
Within a general economic context of declining
population and income, and stabilized employment, the
Cleveland Clinic has emerged as one of the strongest
performers in Cleveland. The Cleveland Clinic Foundation has
become the City's largest employer at a single site, with a
work force of about 9,000 people in 1987. [181
While Cleveland is experiencing double digit
unemployment, the Cleveland Clinic is continuing to expand
its work force, at a rate of about 5% per year. General
medical employment in the area is growing at a rate of 3.5%
per year. [19] The Clinic's recent physical expansion has
also created construction jobs. In 1984, when the Clinic
employed 7600 people its total payroll was $200 million.
This represented $4 million in tax revenues to the City of
Cleveland, and $7.3 million to the State of Ohio. A 1984
estimate of local expenditures by employees on goods and
services was $133 million. A $228 million bond issue to fund
expansion was received favorably by investors in 1984. The
bond issue was the largest ever brought to market by a
freestanding health-care institution. [20]
The Cleveland Clinic, by maintaining a market targeted
at seven states and international presence, has managed to
run counter to the prevailing economic trends in the
Cleveland area. Its next largest competitor is the Mayo
Clinic. [21] The Clinic presence creates much of the value
for its surrounding land. Understandably, the Clinic has
become a valuable institution to the city and its residents.
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The Clinic's value, in conjunction with University Circle's
strong concentration of cultural amenities, educational and
medical facilities, create the underlying strength for the
Doan Center project to build upon.
DOAN CENTER'S POLITICAL CONTEXT
Background M City's Political Structure
George Voinovich has been Cleveland's mayor since 1980.
Voinovich, a Republican, has announced plans to seek a Senate
nomination in 1988. Prior to his term as mayor, he was Lt.
Governor of the state of Ohio. Cleveland's next mayoral race
will be in 1989. During Voinovich's tenure, the two year
mayoral term was changed to four years. (22]
Cleveland's mayoral elections are based on a party
system. Cleveland has a strong council government which is
ward-based. Wards are set by contiguous geographical
areas, and there are no at-large city councilmen. Every
ward has an identical number of constituents.
All 21 councilmen are Democrats. Some perceive that the
Democratic council has a better coexistence with a Republican
mayor, since party politics are non-competitive. In 1987,
Cleveland has a white ethnic mayor and a black Council
president, George Forbes. Forbes has been prominent in
Cleveland politics since the 1960's. The Council President
is very powerful, almost equal to the mayor. Council
representation is split almost 50/50 between blacks and
whites (10 black reps, 11 white reps). This division occurs
in a pattern similar to the voting population, on an
-18-
east-west basis. [23]
Doan Center is in Ward 6 and Artha Woods is the
councilperson. She is also council's representative to the
city planning commission; and therefore, chairperson of the
council's planning committee. University Circle is in Ward 9
which is George Forbes' ward. Woods, for the most part,
supports the Cleveland Clinic and its expansion plan. In one
race her opponent was anti-institution, but also had personal
integrity problems; she won. (24] The Clinic employs 15-20%
of the residents in the local community. [25]
The city took a new approach to real estate development
under the Voinovich era. Prior to Voinovich's term, Dennis
Kucinich was Cleveland's mayor. The youngest man to be
elected to that office, Kucinich ran on a populist platform,
and was very anti-business. Kucinich came very close to
being recalled, after the city defaulted on its bond
repayments in 1978. Some believed Ameritrust, the bank,
called the loans for political rather than financial reasons.
Voinovich is pro-business and pro-development, as long as the
development doesn't result in displacement of residents.
Cleveland does not have a problem of land shortage or
gentrification. The city has lost 49% of its population
since the early 1950's. Development is seen as filling
voids. Conflicts over development are not prevalent. [26]
The city wants to encourage development of housing,
night life and hotels. The city recognizes the medical
institutions at University Circle as a way to counter current
employment trends and generate spin off economic development.
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The private market has shown more interest in developing the
downtown area. The city is interested in leveraging private
sector initiative, particularly for areas like Doan Center.
For an urban redevelopment project like Doan Center, the
city does not have one central department or agency (i.e., a
redevelopment authority). Instead, three departments would
handle a project of this type. They are the City Planning
Commission, the Economic Development Department and the
Community Development Department. Development Service Teams
were established in order to reintegrate the three
departments within the city's administration that deal with
real estate development. One DST is assigned to each Civic
Vision region.
Economic Development and City Planning have played a
more active role in Doan Center. The City Planning
Department's involvement is with policy planning. Zoning, in
the past, was reactive, not proactive. However, the new
comprehensive plan, Civic Vision, may shift this trend.
The Director of Economic Development is Andy Udris, and
was formerly Gary Conley. This department handles physical
development, because of its contact with real estate
developers. Economic Development also processes Urban
Development Action Grant (UDAG) applications. Under Gary
Conley's tenure, Economic Development turned around
Cleveland's priority with the Federal Government in terms of
UDAG's. Udris came from HUD and was Conley's assistant. He
was perceived as the UDAG wizard for the city. Cleveland is
now the biggest recipient of UDAG grants. The city Is
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willing ta facilitate with UDAG supDort for the Doan Center
project. [27]
Ih& Civic Vision Plan
By Autumn of 1988, the City of Cleveland expects its
CIVIC VISION plan and requisite zoning changes to be
complete. Civic Vision was funded with $1 million in private
funding from the following sources: the Cleveland Foundation,
the Gund Foundation, Cleveland Tomorrow, and Standard Oil
Foundation. The city matches foundation funding with staff
support. Some staff positions are directly funded by the
Foundations.[28] Cleveland has a unique asset in the
abundance of private, nonprofit funding sources which show an
interest in civic minded undertakings.
Civic Vision is the new physical, land use and zoning
plan with projections out to the year 2000. Citizen input
was solicited through regular public meetings. Business and
institutional input was not directly solicited in this way,
but is sought and provided. These groups seemed to have more
of a direct line to the mayor or other powerful people at
city hall.
Land Use Plans developed in Civic Vision will be used to
update zoning. Zoning was adopted in Cleveland in 1929 and
the most comprehensive revision was done in the 1940's. The
last comprehensive urban plan was done in 1949. The
population in the city of Cleveland was over 900,000 in the
1940's and is now down to 435,000.
The City Planning Commission has, for the most part,
incorporated what Doan Center, Inc. and University Circle,
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Inc. proposed for their areas. As the planning staff
described it, May and Gleisser were given a blank map and
asked what they wanted. Planning saw this area as an
"institutional island" and saw no reason to oppose what DCI
and UCI wanted. Neighborhood input in that area was not
great. The Council Representative supports Doan Center
Inc.'s intentions. According to the Planning Department,
there was no active constituency which would be opposed to
DCI's plan, although conflicts might arise over what type
housing would be best for the success and viability of the
area. [291
Cleveland's = Base
The City of Cleveland has improved its fiscal status
since the bond default of 1978; but it still faced major
problems in 1987. The city's tax base was largely funded by
income tax, which contributed 80% of the tax revenues.
Property tax contributed the other 20%.[30] Declining
employment in the city means a declining tax base. Also,
public infrastructure investment which was deferred in past
decades will eventually pose a major expense in future city
dollars. [31)
In Cleveland, tax abatement was used in the 70's for
downtown office buildings. Kucinich ran on an anti-tax
abatement platform. In 1986, the city reinstituted tax
abatement for new residential development only. To date
three projects have been approved. Mayfield Triangle at
University Circle is one of the three. Each time a project
goes for tax abatement, it is reviewed by City Council on a
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case by case basis; because the state law doesn't
differentiate between commercial and residential uses. [32]
Nonprofit institutions like the Clinic are exempt from
property tax on land used for institutional purposes. The
Clinic does not make payments in lieu of property taxes.
However, as a major employer, the Clinic contributes
substantially to the payroll tax revenues. [33]
Tax Increment Financing is permitted by state law but
not used. The city must purchase the land in question and
then execute a ground lease with building owners. So if the
land was leased to a single owner it might be easier. The
city has used special assessment districts to generate funds
for improvements. [34]
Ta- City's Role In tat Doan Center Proiect
The city will facilitate the private forces which are
leading the project, but won't take the lead in planning the
project. The City Planning Commission will be open to zoning
changes for the area. The City will help by using eminent
domain. CPC can conduct blight studies in conjunction with
community development plans, in order to use eminent domain.
The city is ready to do this for Doan Center. There is no
city-wide design review or controls. A Public Land
Protective District designation would establish urban design
guidelines for implementation. The Fine Arts Committee would
then administer these guidelines. The Euclid Corridor is not
currently a protective district. Conformance to design
guidelines in that area has been at the initiative of groups
like Midtown Corridor, DCI and UCI. Any project that uses
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UDAG grants or eminent domain would be subject to design
review by the Fine Arts Commission. [35]
Approvals
The process for zoning changes is that an applicant
brings a proposal to the City Planning Commission, which acts
in an advisory role to City Council. City Council then votes
on the proposed change. There a g_ strong tradition in
Cleveland 2L deferrIng ta the opinion 2i thg ward councilman
ga zoning issues.
A strong environmental review process, like California's
or Massachusetts', does not exist in Ohio. The State EPA has
been weak as far as supporting Federal EPA positions. This
was especially true when Rhodes was governor. Ohio has no
regulation on auto emissions and does not inspect vehicles.
The State is very "free enterprise", with regard to
environmental issues. [36]
Cleveland has a history of effective public/private
partnerships for neighborhood based residential developments.
These partnerships on larger commercial ventures are a recent
trend in Cleveland. These partnerships exist largely because
of private foundation's, business' support, and the city's
ability to access UDAG funds. The mayor's hope is that these
new ventures will transcend politicians and political
changes. However, corporation's and foundation's willingness
to support development projects may be tied to political
administrations. Groups like Doan Center Inc. and Midtown
Corridor were seen as ways to get the corporations and
foundations directly interested in specific planning areas,
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so that if the mayor changes, the support will remain. If
this support remanins, Voinovich may have created a very
effective legacy for implementing functions commonly taken on
by city government.
EVOLUTION OF THE CURRENT DOAN CENTER PROJECT
The origins of planning for Doan Center can be traced to
University Circle, Inc., where plans prepared in the 1970's
included a "New Town In Town." (37] The Doan Center area
began to emerge as one needing independent attention in the
early 1980's. The planning concept which set Doan Center in
its own strategic location was rooted in the Euclid Corridor,
sometimes called the Dual Hub Corridor. {SEE EXHIBIT D} The
Dual Hub Corridor is also the focus of a joint study funded
by UMTA, which is analyzing the feasibility of improved
transportation along the corridor. [38]
Euclid Avenue is to Downtown Cleveland as Broadway is to
New York. It is the one street which runs diagonally to a
grid of streets that emanates from Cleveland's Public Square.
Once Euclid Avenue gets out to the Doan Center vicinity, it
runs parallel to the grid of city blocks. Euclid Avenue was
historically known as Millionaire's Row. The mansions that
housed Cleveland's leading industrialists have, for the most
part, been demolished. Euclid Avenue, like the rest of the
city experienced a period of decline. Recently, it has
emerged as a focus for reinvestment.
In the summer of 1981, the Euclid Corridor, and Doan
Center, particularly, became the focus of a conference called
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by Mayor Voinovich, University circle, Inc., and the city
Planning Commission. Voinovich believed strongly in the
necessity of establishing private, quasi-public sector
interest groups to plan for and implement urban redevelopment
strategies. The justification for this private sector basis
was to ensure that planned redevelopment would transcend the
winds of political change at city hall.[39]
Under the leadership of Richard Tullis, the Doan Center
Task Force (DCTF) was formed in late 1982. Tullis is the
former chairman of the board of Harris Corporation, a major
Cleveland corporation which has relocated to Melbourne,
Florida. Tullis had been very active in the University
Circle and Hough areas, and was part of the leadership
structure of University Circle, Inc. (UCI). Tullis was
instrumental in soliciting the support of the Cleveland
Clinic, and the leadership of William Kiser, the Clinic's
C.E.O., for the DCTF. The membership of the task force
provided $150,000 in funding to conduct a financial and
physical planning study for the area. This study was managed
by UCI's Community Development Department, which included Ken
McGovern, Mike May, and Marvelous Ray Baker. These three
later formed the professional staff for Doan Center, Inc.[40]
Members of the Doan Center Task Force were:
The Cleveland Clinic Foundation
University Circle, Inc.
Case Western Reserve University
The Ohio College of Podiatric Medicine
Woodruff Hospital (no longer in business)
Women's General Hospital (no longer in business)
Cleveland Health and Education Museum
The Cleveland Playhouse
Ohio Industrial Commission
Operation Alert(a minority leadership group)[411
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Halcyon Ltd., of Hartford, was retained to produce a
feasibility study which included market, physical, and
stakeholder analyses. Sasaki Associates worked with Halcyon
to produce a master plan which broke the site down into
components according to uses and phasing.
In Halcyon's 1984 report, the following results and
issues were described:
As in other active Euclid Corridor sectors,
such as Midtown, Playhouse Square, the St.
Vincent Quadrangle and University Circle, the
Doan Center stakeholder interests have had to
organize in order to leverage their discrete
corporate and institutional investments into
maximum physical and economic benefits for the
district, city and region. The Task Force's
fundamental challenge is to accomodate its
members' needs consistent with contiguous
residential and commercial development.
Critical issues that have surfaced include how
to avoid creating both physical and economic
"walls" between the proposed development and
the surrounding community; and how to extend
the quality environment that this development
represents to the areas north and south.
In pursuing these important issues, the Doan
Center Task Force has worked closely with the
City Planning Commisssion, the Mayor's office,
City Council leadershp, local development
groups (e.g. MidTown) and neighborhood groups
operating in the Fairfax and Hough
neighborhoods (including New Cleveland-6 and
Hough Area Development Corporation). It is
critical that these working relationships
continue, particularly with the professionally
staffed neighborhood entities, in order to
establish broad community support as the Doan
Center process enters the City's Community
Development Plan stage. [42)
Halcyon's report, "concluded that the large-scale
change, so often articulated as being needed by all sectors,
was achievable." [431 The large population of workers and
visitors to the area were seen as a potential market, yet
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untapped. Markets were found for community and specialty
retail, hotel, and residential uses. The report also
acknowledged that most development in the area would require
some type of financial subsidy, either grants (UDAG's), low
interest loans, tax increment financing, tax exempt bonds, or
public subsidy of infrastructure improvements. [441
Halcyon produced a master plan which created eight
components, with a total projected budget of over $250
million. {SEE EXHIBIT K} Halcyon identified the mixed use
retail, office, and hotel/conference center component at the
east end of the site near University Circle, and market rate
housing on Euclid Avenue across from the Clinic as the two
components for immediate focus. Reasons for this strategy
were that these two pieces could have the greatest positive
impact on changing the area's image to a positive one. They
were sited (at that time) on Clinic owned land, and they did
not displace residents. [451
Halcyon also marketed the project to national developers
and solicited their feedback. Although developers were
impressed with the depth of information provided and the
strength of the "localized" market due to the institutions,
they rejected the opportunity to participate in the area's
development because investment objectives could not be met;
feasibility was contingent on local decisions not yet
resolved; too much predevelopment work would be required for
the amount of risk involved; and not enough return available
for the time and effort.[461
Mike May, V.P. of Doan Center Inc. described the
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response to the Halcyon study with private developers as
follows:
1) The location, which was five miles east of downtown
Cleveland, could be a problem.
2) The Cleveland image, which had negative connotations
nationally, was a problem.
3) More predevelopment work was needed to establish exactly
what land was available, and what financing sources were
available to finance gaps between project costs and
revenues.
Mike May noted that even though developers had these
concerns, the fact that they gave the project serious
attention was an accomplishment. [47]
DOAN CENTER, INC.
The Halcyon report also recommended the formation of a
formal entity to oversee predevelopment work for the Doan
Center area. In July, 1984, Doan Center, Inc. was
established as a nonprofit, 501(c)3, corporation with a
$500,000 operating budget. Doan Center, Inc. is responsible
for the planning process, communicating with major
stakeholders, and acting as brokers to seek out and bring in
private developers. Doan Center, Inc.'s purpose was to take
on the "table setting" predevelopment functions in order to
prepare people, parcels, and projects in the Doan Center area
for redevelopment.[48]
Obiectives
Doan Center, Inc.'s objectives as stated in 1985 were
to:
1) Produce large-scale, early development with resultant
regional impact that is large enough to capture the
-29-
broad--based community support essential to
implementation of all other Doan Center components.
2) Obtain strong institutional and neighborhood support
for housing and commercial development and the
accompanying public improvements necessary to
dramatically improve the area's image.
3) Achieve an economically and racially integrated
community of high quality that has a regional
identity and contributes to the vitality of the
institutional members and to the City of
Cleveland.
Sub-objectives of the stakeholders were then defined as:
Institutions: A high quality hotel/conference facility,
specialty retail facilities, and employee-related
middle income housing.
Neighborhood Groups: Affordable senior citizen and
moderate-income housing, community retail facilities,
and active participation in the implementation of the
development strategy.
City of Cleveland: Leveraging the proposed development
to generate new jobs and improve tax revenues. [491
Doan Center, Inc. (DCI) continued under the leadership
of Richard Tullis for its first 18 months. Tullis
relinquished this position to Herbert Strawbridge, who was
perceived as a neutral figure, with no special connection to
any of DCI's institutional members. Strawbridge is a
prominent Cleveland retailer, and former president of
Higbee's, a major Cleveland department store chain. His
title is Chairman of the Board. Tullis remained a player in
the project because of his involvement with UCI. [501 DCI's
professional staff was established with McGovern as
president, May as Vice President, and Baker as Assistant
Corporate Secretary. Membership changed slightly from the
original Task Force. University Hospitals joined in July,
1984 and Mount Sinai Hospital joined in 1986. The Ohio
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Industrial Commission Is no longer involved with DCI. [51]
{SEE EXHIBIT L FOR A LIST OF MEMBERS)
Funding for Doan Center, Inc.'s operation came from its
member institutions and local philanthropic foundations. The
Cleveland Clinic funded 50% of DCI's initial operating
budget. The George Gund Foundation, the Cleveland Foundation
and the Standard Oil Foundation contributed $600,000 for a
predevelopment study prepared by Enterprise Development
Corporation, and for DCI's operating support. This study and
plan focused on the Mixed Use Component of the Halcyon plan.
{See Component I in Exhibit K} Proposed uses for the Mixed
Use Component included a hotel, conference center, and
specialty retail. EDC's founder, James Rouse, is famous for
creating urban festival marketplaces, such as Faneuil Hall in
Boston and Harbor Place in Baltimore. Specialty retail is
one of his fortes. [52]
Strawbridge was influential in attracting James Rouse's
attention. Rouse is a prominent national developer. Rouse's
recently formed company, the Enterprise Development
Corporation (EDC), is the for-profit arm of the nonprofit
Enterprise Foundation. The Enterprise Foundation is
committed to the development of low income housing in urban
neighborhoods. The Enterprise Foundation is quite active in
Cleveland, and works closely with the neighborhood
development efforts of groups like Cleveland Tomorrow. EDC
Is involved with many public/private retail development
ventures in "second tier" cities. EDC usually undertakes
these risky ventures with substantial public sector support
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for land costs and financing. Rouse was sufficiently
convinced of the Doan Center project's viability to agree to
conduct a predevelopment study for the Mixed Use Component.
The developer performed this work, which included in-depth
site analysis, market analysis, and component specific
strategies, for a fee. [53]
EDC has recently completed its predevelopment analysis.
It concluded that there was a strong market for the specialty
retail. EDC's commitment to the hotel and conference use
was not as strong. Therefore, EDC was seeking guarantees for
bookings or roomnight rates. (54] One result of the EDC
study was to shift the location of this component from the
location proposed in the Halcyon study. EDC also prepared an
updated master plan which reflected changes and refinements
that had taken place in other components of Doan Center.
{SEE EXHIBIT M} The new proposed location for the Mixed Use
Component, which was a strategic improvement in terms of
establishing a physical connection with University Circle,
has some inherent difficulties. These include the site's
location within a 100 year flood plain, the required
relocation of city roads, and sharing a parcel with John Hay
High School, land controlled by the Cleveland School Board.
As of 1987, EDC expects the site assembly and preparation
work to take about two years. DCI, as a local influence,
will conduct this site assembly work. The level of
institutional commitment, in the form of subsidies or
roomnight guarantees, to the Mixed Use Component is also an
area of question in the summer of 1987. (551
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In its current stage of evolution, the Doan Center
project has made some strategic improvements. The mixed use
component now physically occupies a site which links and
reorients the east end of Doan Center to University
Circle. {SEE EXHIBIT N} Issues of consensus and stakeholder
interests have been explored in greater depth. Participants
have been kept up to date and informed. (This was evident
from the consistency of the participants' information on the
project.)
Signs of revitalization are appearing throughout the
area. UCI's residential project, the Mayfield Triangle, has
both developer and city commitment. The State's $60 million
W.O. Walker Rehabilitation Center is nearing completion.
Community intitiated development has been occuring in
adjacent neighborhoods --- Lexington Village in Hough, and
residential developments in the Fairfax area planned by New
Cleveland-6 and NOAH. Local private developers have shown an
interest in the community retail component at the west end of
the site. Also, a proposal to combine a Clinic-operated
hotel with market rate housing have emerged, failed, and
reemerged again in a different form. This project, the
Euclid Hotel, will be the focus of an in-depth case study as
part of this thesis.
Generally, Clevelanders seem to be more optimistic about
the local economy than they were three years ago. Evidence
of construction and redevelopment activity can be seen
Downtown. The atmosphere is one of anticipation.
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Chapter Two
CURRENT STATUS QE TfE DOAN CENTER PRQJECT
PARTICIPANTS' PERCEPTIONS
In general, perceptions about the Doan Center project
and the process Center were fairly consistent; at least among
the stakeholders who were interviewed. (See Appendix A for
List of Interviewees and Note on Sources). Differences of
opinion were more apparent in terms of expectations about the
project's implementation and outcome. In 1987, with planning
and predevelopment well underway, implementation and
realization of the plan is the current challenge. Almost
five years of study have passed, and the original ten year
time frame is still seen as realistic by the staff. The less
direct participants found progress in the time expended to be
an area of concern. Consistency in how the parties
understood the Doan Center project (terms like table
setting, stakeholders, and consensus building were used over
and over), seemed to indicate that the professional staff was
doing its job in terms of keeping the parties informed.
Participants viewed the role of Doan Center, Inc. as one
of "table setting". The DCI organization was seen as a group
of planners, but not necessarily implementors. Some believed
the planning was very focused on physical plans while others
felt it encompassed broader issues of economic and
neighborhood development. Table setting encompassed
predevelopment studies, development of relationships with
City officials and the community, and changing people's
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perceptions of the area in terms of what they can imagine it
being. Most participants saw DCI's role as a difficult one.
Parties interviewed appreciated the problems that the DCI
staff would encounter in trying to bring so many institutions
together on a project like the Mixed Use Component. Some
raised this inter-institutional relationship as a possible
obstacle to the project's success. The historic rivalry
between the University Circle medical establishment and the
Cleveland Clinic was perceived as a problem because
cooperation among institutions would be required for Doan
Center to achieve its objectives.
A sense of impatience and high expectations was also
common among some of the indirect participants. They felt
that since Doan Center Inc. had the backing and clout of the
Cleveland Clinic's membership, DCI and the project should be
able to accomplish more, in a shorter time frame. The direct
participants felt the project was progressing on schedule,
more or less.
Most parties interviewed perceived the project primarily
as the Mixed Use Component, yet understood that the project
had a broader scope. This component received the most
coverage in the local press, perhaps because of Rouse's
involvement. The emphasis on the Mixed Use Component is
understandable since, singularly, it has the most potential
to transform the image and character of the Doan Center site.
People may have expected that project to move first, while in
actuality, other components are further along in the
development process (the Community Retail, the Euclid Hotel).
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Most participants were convinced of the market for the
specialty retail and conference center; and also of the need
for a hotel of some size. Some also felt that residential
uses in the area would succeed, particularly apartments
priced in the $450-$500/month range. One party labelled the
project, "institutional infill".
In terms of market, some perceived the Doan Center
project as inevitable because the area had "latent demand".
This perception was directed to the mixed use piece, which
people felt would be realized in some form or other, with or
without DCI to facilitate it. Others had less of a laissez
faire attitude towards the Doan Center project and had some
genuine concerns for its success. These concerns rallied
around the issue of whether the Cleveland Clinic is truly
behind the project and willing to take concrete actions which
demonstrate this commitment. These commitments ranged from
guarantees of hotel/conference use to a willingness to act as
lender. Interestingly, the Clinic seems to feel it has done
enough by providing risk capital for predevelopment.
Physical obstacles to the planned location of the Mixed
Use Component were also seen as problemmatic. Many were very
skeptical about the chances of relocating John Hay High
School or coexisting with it. Other problems were seen as an
unclear definition of the actual project. Because the
project has undergone some changes through its evolution,
some participants wonder what its current status really is,
and whether a formal proposal will ever be put on the table
for action.
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The project has considerable support from the City, to
the extent that the City can provide support. The City
Planning Commission, at this point, sees no major obstacles
to the project as far as approvals. Other participants, such
as developers, did not perceive zoning or other city
approvals to be an obstacle. The City saw its role as
facilitator, not leader, on the Doan Center project.
Financial support from the City for the project will be
somewhat limited, due to fiscal constraints, or possibly due
to the City's tradition of reactive rather than proactive
participation in physical development. Mayor Voinovich seems
to be interested in turning this position around, by building
a base of nonprofit planning/development entities. The City
is ready and waiting with funds for engineering studies on
road relocations, eminent domain power, and UDAG support.
The City has given this project top priority, along with four
others, and expects it to accomplish the physical
revitalization and economic stimulation that were its
objectives. (1]
Views on the planning process used for the Doan Center,
Inc. included: a learning process, an important exercise,
constituency building, too much consensus building, too
politically focused, not action oriented. In a positive
light, the staff was seen to have a high degree of
credibility and some were impressed with how well they have
managed to solicit input of stakeholders. The process is
perceived as a genuine effort to integrate people's views, if
in a somewhat indirect way. One suggestion was made to
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actually open up the process to more direct community input,
possibly on a component by component basis. Others suggested
closing down the process, in a way, and looking for a 51%
majority rather than complete consensus.
The process has succeeded in laying the groundwork for
future action. Compared to 1984, the participants now have a
raised awareness of the project and its possibilities. The
stakeholder relationships built over the past few years will
now be tested, in terms of strength, when action is finally
taken. The challenge now will be whether the Doan Center
project can pass the barriers in the impementation phase and
become a reality.
THE CLEVELAND CLINIC FOUNDATION
An in depth examination of one major stakeholder, the
Cleveland Clinic Foundation, is necessary to understand the
Doan Center project. The Clinic plays a dominant and often
multi-faceted role in the project. It holds land, will
directly and indirectly use facilities, and may become a
partner on future projects within the Doan Center area. The
Clinic also has its own objectives for its landholdings and
their surroundings. The influence and presence of the Clinic
is central to the topic of this thesis. The following
section focuses on the Clinic in order to clarify its
position in relation to the project.
The Cleveland Clinic Foundation is a
National Referral Center and an international
health resource dedicated to providing
excellent specialized medical care in response
to public need. The integration of research
and education with outpatient and hospital
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care in a private, not-for-profit group
practice distinguishes The Cleveland Clinic
Foundation in American medicine.
Multidisciplinary interaction stimulates each
doctor's individual quest for effective, less
costly solutions to the most complex medical
problems. Together, the men and women of The
Cleveland Clinic Foundation strive to enhance
the quality of life for each patient. [2]
More simply, the Clinic's mission is to provide tertiary
medical care and to support research and education. The
Clinic is, in effect, a very large group practice. About 500
doctors own and operate the nonprofit institution. The
Clinic's commitment to research and education is what enables
it to function as a nonprofit. (About half the nation's
hospitals are nonprofits.) Any profit earned is reinvested
into research, education, and real estate held for future
institutional uses. Recently, the Clinic reinvested $8-10
million in research. The Clinic also recently invested close
to $300 million in its Cleveland facilities and plans to
invest that much or more in a satellite facility in Fort
Lauderdale, Florida. The Clinic has a facility in Turkey.[3]
The Cleveland Clinic was founded in 1921 by four doctors
who left University Hospital to start a group practice. This
legacy of the split from University Hospital is still
apparent in the different philosophies and operations of the
two hospitals. [4] The Clinic is run by a Board of Trustees,
a lay board, and a Board of Governors, the doctors. The
Chairman of the Board of Governors is William Kiser, M.D.
Kiser is viewed by many as the ultimate decision maker within
the Clinic, particularly with regard to the Doan Center
project. The Board of Governors has programmatic
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responsibility, while the Board of Trustees has fiscal
responsibility. The Board of Governors has in the past gone
beyond its medical mission to take on fiscal issues. During
the last major Clinic expansion, the Clinic issued debt on a
real estate venture for the first time in its history. At
that point, the Trustees pulled in the reigns on the domain
of the Governors.[5]
Background on Clinitec., Inc.
The nonprofit Cleveland Clinic Foundation is the sole
stockholder of a for-profit entity, Clinitec, Inc. Clinitec
undertakes the Clinic's business ventures which are not
directly related to its mission. These include some of the
more commercial research and development activities,
licensing agreements, royalties for inventions, and possible
joint ventures with other R & D companies. Clinitec, Inc. is
also responsible for those real estate development operations
which are considered unrelated business of the nonprofit
Clinic. Prior to Clinitec's establishment in 1983, Jack
Auble, a former real estate attorney had that responsibility.
Development at that point was primarily acquisitions
related.
The IRS has begun challenging not-for-profits that go
into unrelated business. A clear definition of the criteria
that establish a related or unrelated business is difficult
to make. To be safe, Clinitec, Inc. provides a filter for
taxable revenues before these revenues feed back into the
nonprofit, Cleveland Clinic Foundation.
David Goss, the director of Clinitec, has been active in
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developing a Corporate Social Responsibility Policy for the
Cleveland Clinic. Until this was recently completed, the
Clinic had no formal mechanisms for supporting the community
around them. Goss was originally hired as Director of Urban
Development, prior to the formal establishment of Doan
Center, Inc. Once DCI was established in 1984, Goss became
responsible for interacting with this organization. As he
explained it, DCI was perceived as a development corporation
for the Clinic. When it became more obvious that Doan Center
was, "only a Clinic undertaking", the decision was made to
create a separate entity to deal with it. Now, about 1/3 of
Goss' time is spent on Doan Center. Also, the Clinic made a
conscious decision not to get involved in real estate
development, which did not directly serve its mission.
The Clinic's objectives with regard to real estate are
to support projects which allow it to achieve its mission.
To this end, the Clinic also supports services for its
visitors. Therefore, projects which will make the Clinic's
environment more attractive to its patient base and more
competitive in attracting physicians are also indirect
objectives.
The Cleveland Clinic Foundation's original policy
regarding the land it bought during the 1970's had a
"protectionist" rationalization, with a little bit of vision
about the future needs for land. The foresight about land
needed for expansion was not as great as it has now become.
Now the need for expansion capacity is a priority. However,
all land now held by the Clinic will not be needed for
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institutional uses. Thus, other uses will be considered
which the Clinic sees as contributing to a desirable ambiance
in order to make them attractive to their target market.
This target market is focused on seven states and
international trade.
As far as risk versus return, return is not an issue for
the Clinic. The Clinic does not view its land holdings as a
source of capital. They view real estate as a way to
facilitate the environmental issues of their surroundings.
With institutional projects, capital is a priority. With
real estate that is used for unrelated business, return is
less important than risk and control. The amount of
noninstitutional development on clinic-owned property will
be minimal, in Goss' opinion.
Although the Cleveland Clinic loaned some money at low
interest rates to the Lexington Village project, this is not
a standard procedure. The Clinic sees a conflict in acting
as a lender, when they themselves are going to nonprofit
foundations to ask for grants. Contributing to this conflict
is the Clinic's size and the fact that it is such a large
employer. People perceive the Clinic as a for-profit
operation. This misconception contributes to an image that
the Clinic is not responsive to the community.[6]
Strategies Used by the Clinic ia Real Estate Development
The strategy used by the Clinic on real estate ventures
depends on the circumstances. Clinitec is now exploring more
sophisticated deal structures for real estate ventures.
Currently, the Clinic is considering a venture with a large
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developer, Tishman-Speyer Medic of New York, to develop a
medical administrative office building along Euclid Avenue.
In this case, the developer would do a turnkey (build to
suit) project. The Clinic would lease its land to the
developer, possibly at a reduced rate. The developer would
build the building and manage it. The Clinic would then
lease the building back from the developer, and possibly buy
it back in the future. The Clinic will not be an equity
partner in this scenario. [7]
The Clinic traditionally paid cash for its real estate.
The Clinic has never been a tenant in another owner's
building. It won't sell its land, but will set up ground
leases or use land as the equity contribution to a
partnership. The Clinic does not perceive itself as having
the capabilities to take on real estate development projects
on its own. Also, in order to avoid being a landlord, as the
Clinic landbanks, it usually clears any structures from the
sites. This strategy has caused problems with the community
in the past, since relocation of residents can by a problem
area. (8] UCI has taken a different approach to land
banking. It will continue to lease out buildings on its
land. This puts UCI in the complex, and sometimes
undesirable situation, of acting as landlord. [9] The Clinic
does not want to be viewed as a landlord or a developer, but
wants control over the development of their land and
surroundings.
When the Clinic contributed 50% of the funds to DCI's
initial operating budget, it saw DCI as the professional
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entity that would handle these development activities. The
Clinic also recognizes that Clinic owned land is the carrot
and the stick for the Doan Center project. If DCI and the
Clinic are successful in upgrading the Clinic's context, then
the Clinic believes it won't have to build housing for its
workers. The market will take care of this via private
developers. [101
Clinic's View aL Doan Center Pro~ect
Goss believes some subsidy or incentive is required to
make redevelopment of the Doan Center area feasible. The
Clinic, in partially funding Doan Center Inc., entered the
project at the high risk capital stage. The doctors
understand the need for the various components of the master
plan. Goss sees DCI's challenge as getting developers to
look at the Doan Center market area as a difficult one.
Goss sees the Clinic and DCI as totally separate. The
Clinic is 1 of 9 votes on the Doan Center Board, but also has
land ownership in the master plan area. Goss sees the assets
of the Doan Center project as the ability to achieve a better
physical environment which in turn improves the Clinic's
marketabilty to its patients. The only liability to the
Clinic right now is if nothing happens with the plan. The
objective is to change the perception of where University
Circle ends. [11]
Relationship between the Clinic and other Players
Since its founding, the Clinic has run counter to
University Hospitals and other medical institutions in the
area. The other institutions aren't growing as rapidly. The
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other institutions also
doesn't see competition
want an improved environment. Goss
between the institutions on real
estate issues. He does see competition for doctors, although
the Clinic, as a huge group practice, attracts a different
type of doctor than University Hospital where the doctors are
in private practice. The two hospitals are in competition
for patients. In that respect, they are like Macy's and
Gimble's. They won't communicate except on the Doan Center
project. Doan Center can benefit all the institutions. In
Goss' opinion, other players don't have much at risk in the
project except funding for DCI.
Compatibility problems with private developers are more
a function of the Clinic's location. The Clinic is the
element that makes the location attractive to developers.
Because of the economy in the area, the parties have to go
the extra mile to see a project like Doan Center happen.
Goss sees the Clinic's willingness to take on predevelopment
risk in the form of risk capital as fulfilling this need.
Goss feels the Clinic is not willing to provide
roomnight guarantees or to go out on a limb any further for
Doan Center. They would only provide roomnight guarantees
based on their own projected needs. However, they still have
the option to build their own conference center as part of
their complex. The Clinic has options that University
Hospital doesn't have, because that hospital is more land
locked. CWRU and University Hospital also need a conference
center. The Clinic wouldn't develop a conference center to
serve other institutions. Instead, the Clinic would build
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its own, internal, center, Goss understands the need to
subsidize the conference center, but not the hotel. (12]
The Clinic's RelationshiD with the Local Community
The Clinic has been compared to a fortress or a castle
with a moat around it. Physically, it portrays this image
with walls along the street edge and bridged walkways that
allow visitors to avoid direct contact with the street.
There are practical rationales for this appearance, such as
the need to provide security for employees who come and go at
odd hours or the need to provide contained, controlled access
for patients within the facility. However, these reasons do
not help improve the Clinic's esteem with the local
community. The Clinic, as a tertiary care facility, does not
accept the local community in its emergency room.[12]
The Clinic's quiet approach to land acquisition (which
was done to avoid speculation or hold out sellers) left some
residents suspicious of the Clinic's motives. In a 1986
newspaper article, Leon Hogg, president of the Black Economic
Union was quoted as follows: "The Cleveland Clinic Foundation
has never really told its story, and a lot of people, not
knowing what is happening fear the unknown." He also viewed
the Clinic as a, "bastion of white wealth and power."[13]
During its land acquisition process, in the early 1970's, the
Clinic paid off a councilman. The councilman was jailed and
the Clinic's management changed. This incident is indicative
of the Clinic's past problems with community relations, which
it is now attempting to correct. (14]
The Clinic is interested in improving its community
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relations, and has made progress with the business community.
Most of these parties have a positive perception of the
Clinic and its contribution to the local economy. The City
also values the Clinic as an institution. However, the local
community does not have such a positive perception of its
neighboring institution. Perhaps factors like Goss'
participation in the Fairfax neighborhoods New Cleveland-6
local development corporation, will improve community
relations. The Clinic still has a way to go in this respect.
CURRENT CHALLENGES
As the Euclid Hotel Case will illustrate, implementation
of the predevelopment work seems to be the overriding
challenge for Doan Center. Within that, there are
subproblems of funding, market forces, and institutional
competition, cooperation, backing, and commitment. Issues
which must be addressed at this point are:
1) Inter-institutional competition and cooperation. How does
DCI insure that efficient exchanges transpire between the
insititutions, so that each brings the most assets to the
project?
2) Preparation of a strategy and fall back alternatives for
the Mixed Use Component;
3) Packaging the project for private developers. Creating
financial projections and alternative deal structures that
will incorporate the private developer's perspective;
4) Keeping the pace of the project in step with the local
market and national economic forces;
5) Capitalizing on the support that the project has from the
city, the stakeholders, and increasing the support from
private developers in order to create the impetus for change.
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Chapter Three
TfE EUCLID HOLQF PROJECT:
A CASE STUDY
This section of the thesis focuses on a specific
component of the Doan Center project which illustrates the
issues involved with nonprofit/private partnerships in real
estate development. This case description of the Euclid
Hotel Project is intended to illustrate an actual attempt at
structuring such a partnership. Each component within the
Doan Center project is in a different stage in the
development process, and none yet has reached the
construction phase. However, many of the limitations and
opportunities in these partnerships have surfaced during the
predevelopment stage, and this case will present examples of
these advantages and disadvantages.
Every component in the Doan Center area is set up to
stand on its own, but the phasing of the components is
planned strategically to transform the overall image of the
area first. The piece most critical to this transformation
is the Mixed Use Component. This component, which recently
completed market and physical analysis by Enterprise
Development Corporation (EDC), could potentially involve a
multi-party partnership among EDC, other developers, several
University Circle institutions, the Clinic, and DCI. The
city would also be a player, because it will be asked to do
infrastructure improvements, road relocation, possibly aid in
site assembly, and seek UDAG financing.
Understanding what transpired between the parties
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brought together on the Euclid Hotel Component may prove
useful in preparation for the larger, more complex task of
bringing together more than one institution, more than one
developer, and the city for the Mixed Use Component. The
intent in studying the Euclid Hotel project as a "case within
a case" is to provide some insight into the complexities of
partnerships between private developers and nonprofits.
The Euclid Hotel Project was originally planned as a
mixed use building with market rate apartments above
efficiency hotel units. The project was to be a two-party
venture between the Cleveland Clinic and Forest City Dillon,
a Cleveland developer. The Clinic owns the land and was to
execute a ground lease with the developer. The developer
would build the building and then lease back the hotel
portion to the Clinic. The venture was to be a ground lease
with a partial leaseback, but it was never formalized, at the
Clinic's request. Instead, the hotel component will now be
developed solely by Clinitec, Inc., the Clinic's for-profit
arm.
In April, 1985 Doan Center Inc., The Cleveland Clinic
Foundation, and Bolton Square Hotel Company (BSHC) sponsored
a Request For Proposals (RFP) from private developers for the
"Doan Center/Cleveland Clinic Housing Project. The project
(referred to as the Euclid Hotel for this case study) was to
be located on the parcels referred to as Component III in the
Halcyon plan. {SEE EXHIBIT K} The location was a block
bounded by Euclid Avenue, East 93rd Street, East 97th Street,
and Chester Avenue. The concept was a mixed use project
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which would leverage the demand for 100 units of transient
housing (a moderately priced hotel with efficiency suites) to
achieve a market rate housing development within the same
building. The RFP called for a minimum of 150 units of 1BR
and 2BR rental apartments. A budget motel, the 50-room
University Center Motel, and a restaurant existed on the site
and were to be demolished. The motel was operating at 95%
occupancy. The Clinic was fairly sure of the demand for a
facility twice the size, provided room rents could be kept to
$30/night. Market for the market rate apartments was
justified by Halcyon's market study. Halcyon concluded that
the area had a demand for 2600 new market rate units over a
10 year period within the Doan Center district. [1]
The Clinic was willing to set up a ground lease for the
parcel, which it owned. The RFP clearly segregated the
residential hotel as being a Clinic requirement, while the
apartments were a DCI requirement. The Clinic was willing to
take a lease on the hotel units on a triple net basis, with
BSHC taking responsibility for management of this component.
A restaurant would be part of the facility. Other
requirements were $30 room night rental rate and Euclid
Avenue frontage for the hotel. [21
The DCI requirements were for the apartments to rent at
$550/month. The apartments would be geared to institutional
employees, and would have a high quality environment.
Jointly, the Clinic and DCI called for mass and scale in
conformance with master plan objectives and architectural
quality to match standards set by the Clinic's existing
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environment. The two uses were to be linked, but could
maintain separate entrances. Landscaping and site
improvements were to be high quality. The RFP also stated
that DCI and the Clinic would assist with necessary zoning
approvals. Finally, occupancy was desired by early 1987. (3]
As of July, 1987, the site remains as it did when the
RFP was issued two years ago. However, plans are underway to
construct the residential hotel and commercial space with
Clinitec, Inc. acting as sole developer. This case study
will examine the process undertaken when the Clinic attempted
to team up with a private developer in order to accomplish
its own objectives and those of DCI for the broader Doan
Center area plan.
Before a response was received from other private
developers, Forest City Dillon proposed that the Clinic
consider them as developers on a non-competitive basis for a
limited time period. A newspaper report stated that the
Clinic actually approached Forest City. [4] DCI was active
in soliciting Forest City's interest. Forest City Dillon, a
subsidiary of Forest City had a long track record of
multi-family residential construction and development.
Forest City is a Cleveland-based family owned development
corporation which operates on a national level.
The Clinic wanted to build a hotel for patient's
families who come from a seven-state market area. Rooms
would be equipped with kitchenettes and the Clinic would
strive to keep costs within reasonable budgets to make the
stay in Cleveland more affordable for these families. The
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clinic clearly stated in the RFP that it had no intention of
assuming an at-risk position for the market rate housing.
THe RFP stated, "It is understood by the developer that no
capital financing will be required from the Cleveland Clinic
Foundation in the construction and implementation of either
the transient housing or apartment house facilities." [5]
The Clinic's objectives with regard to this project were
to make the development part of the Clinic's "consumer
oriented marketing strategy." This was seen as a means to
maintain the "viability of the institution's primary
mission." A second objective was to creatively manage the
Clinic's real estate holdings so that they could potentially
provide a new source of revenue. As stated in the RFP,
"Although the CCF will not be a source of development
financing within Doan Center, it can utilize its land
holdings to obtain annual returns on its real estate
investments through various land lease and/or equity
participation arrangements with developers." This objective
sought to utilize real estate revenues as a means to "replace
shrinking sources of patient-related revenues to support the
important functions of research and education." Thus, the
objectives of the project were seen as methods for serving
the Clinic's mission. [6]
The RFP also acknowledged broader community oriented
objectives relating to economic development. These relate to
the basic objectives of Doan Center, Inc., as outlined
in Chapter One. Euclid Avenue acts as the frontage for the
Clinic's entry drive, however in terms of physical appearance
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it seems to be the Clinic's backside with parking garages
lining the street. DCI was concerned with the urban design
qualities of this important street/corridor and saw the
project as a way to improve the streetscape. The existing
two-story suburban-looking motel structure was not seen as
appropriate by DCI. They arrived at the concept of combining
a market rate apartment component to give the project more
density. [7]
As the proposed project developed, financing gaps for
the project became apparent. A memo from Ken McGovern to
Bill Kiser and David Goss outlined three strategies for
closing these gaps:
1) The Clinic could proceed on its own to build
a lower quality facility.
2) CCF could subsidize its room night rates in order to
maintain a $30/night rent. In addition, a UDAG would be
necessary to cover a debt service gap for the market rate
apartments.
3) CCF could help reduce the debt service required by
becoming an equity participant, taking on the risks
associated with a limited partner's position. [8]
As of November, a $3.1 million UDAG application was
processed for the project. [9] The Clinic was still
considering the second option of the three above. However,
doubts were raised about the market data for the apartment
component. The market rate housing feasibility data cited in
the RFP and in the UDAG application is attached in EXHIBIT 0.
Addressing the Clinic's concern about the risk of the
"downside potential" of the apartments, DCI pointed out that
comparables were difficult to find for a project which was
pioneering this type of housing at this location. DCI
-53-
regarded Forest City as an organization with a strong housing
track record, excellent bank relationships, experience in
difficult urban redevelopment projects, and the established
Ratner family presence in Cleveland. Thus, the developer was
perceived as being a stable influence for the project. The
Clinic would also have right of first refusal if the
developer were to sell. Finally DCI pointed out that the
best way to guarantee the project's future was to take on a
general partner's position. [10] The semantics at this point
are interesting, because the issue was perceived as risk. A
general partner's position assumes more risk, but has the
benefit of control over the project's management. The Clinic
was not interested in assuming either a general or limited
partner's position and the associated risks.
In early 1986, the Clinic became increasingly
apprehensive about the development venture and began planning
the project without the apartment component. DCI was still
involved but more as planners and facilitators. A letter
from Herb Strawbridge to Bill Kiser outlined some of the
development options the Clinic could pursue on its own. DCI
was advocating the addition of retail space to the program
and expansion capacity for the hotel, retail, and possible
Clinic uses on the site. [11]
As of May 5, 1986 the City of Cleveland cancelled the
original UDAG application, which most believe would have been
approved at month's end. A May 14, 1986 article in the Plain
Dealer announced, "CLINIC REJECTS VENTURE; WILL DEVELOP ON
ITS OWN". The Clinic's director of communication stated, "We
-54-
just decided we would be better off to pursue this
independently." The Clinic also reinforced its commitment to
develop the area. McGovern stated that the Clinic's concern
was to retain control over any development that occurred on
the site. [12]
The Clinic, using Clinitec and DCI, continued to study
the hotel/retail feasibility. Clinitec's financial
consultants Laventhol and Horwath prepared a report in July,
1986 that confirmed the feasibility of $30/night room rates
for the hotel and the need for 22,000 GLA of retail space in
the $8 to $10/SF range. The report proposed three
alternative deal structures as follows:
1) Development for a profit, directly by Clinitec, Inc.
(Wholly owned)
2) Development for a profit, by an outside developer.
Developer to execute and own the project on land
leased from the Clinic. (Ground Lease)
3) Joint Venture with a private developer (Joint
Venture) Financing rates were assumed at 8.25%
interest and a capitalization rate of 10% was used.
These assumptions were also used for option 1.
Participation in cash flow would be split 10% to
Clinitec and 90% to the Developer, and the developer
would receive 100% of the tax benefits. [13]
Each alternative had a detailed analysis of the deal
structures. {See Exhibit P.)
Laventhol and Horwath recommended the wholly owned
development approach because control of the land is
maintained as is long term appreciation of the property.
Also, Clinitec as developer can use the Clinic's favorable
financing rates. The ground lease was rejected because
returns to a developer were seen as too low to be attractive.
The joint venture was rejected because both the developer and
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Clinitec would find returns unsatisfactory, while advantages
to either were not great. (141
The Clinic followed this recommendation and Clinitec is
proceeding with the $10 million development. A Plain Dealer
article on February 18, 1987 announced the plans to build the
hotel/retail complex which will be under construction in the
near future. The article cited further reasons for the
abandonment of the Forest City partnership. David Goss
stated, "The board (of governors) didn't like the joint
venture. We would have been a tenant in the building which
Forest City Dillon would have owned." Forest City's vice
president, Ronald Ratner stated that, "the clinic had 'very
legitimate concerns' about the joint venture arrangement for
the first project and the parting was amicable." (151 In
actuality, the issue for the Clinic was control. The Clinic
was very concerned that once the project was up and running,
with Forest City managing the apartment component, then the
Clinic's total control over this housing would cease to
exist. The Clinic would operate the hotel, but not the
apartments. The concern was that if the market did not
support market rate units at this location, then Forest City
(to protect its investment) would lower rents and the tenant
mix would become unacceptable to the Clinic. [16]
This issue of control and the risks associated with loss
of control is a major conflict for the Clinic as it
encounters different land development scenarios. The Clinic
purchases and owns property mainly for the purpose of
establishing a control mechanism for its surrounding
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environment. Ground leases are a good vehicle for this,
providing they are set up with terms to protect the lessor's
interest. Building ownership provides control over the day
to day management and operation of a development project, but
also carries the associated development risks. The Clinic
wants this control, but does not want to assume the financial
risks. This balance between risk and control is an important
theme in this project, and institutional projects generally.
The following incident further illustrates the
institution's desire for control. Clinitec owns and operates
the Clinic Plaza. The circumstances under which it took this
position relate to the issue of environmental control. In
1985, the Clinic purchased the parcel that holds this
shopping center in order to control the tenant mix. A liquor
store, forced to relocate by the construction of the W.O.
Walker Center, was considering relocation to the site of a
Pick-n-Pay shopping center. The Clinic, upon hearing of
these plans, purchased the site, which is now called Clinic
Plaza. The Clinic did some cosmetic improvements and
brought in a few new retailers in addition to Pick-n-Pay and
the surprising result was that stores generated gross sales
revenues of over $300/SF. The success of the retail use led
them to consider extension of this use across a sidestreet to
form the base of the new hotel. 22,000 SF will be dedicated
to retail use. These shops may evolve into support functions
for hotel users and employees. They will eventually need to
survive independent of the Pick-n-Pay magnet, which is
speculated to relocate to a larger community retail complex
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planned for the 79th street end of the area. [17]
Participants' Perceptions
When the participants, Ken McGovern, Mike May, David
Goss, and Ed Pelavin (Forest City's project manager) were
interviewed in 1987, they provided a view of the project in
retrospect. McGovern saw the implementation process
as follows:
1) Concurrence from the Clinic's Board of Governors.
2) Review of economic and financial issues by the
Clinic's Board of Trustees. Trustees concerns were
financial feasibility and return. Return was
constrained by the desire to charge low rates for a
good quality facility. The objective was to break
even, and subsidy was seen as questionable.
3) Actions must be rooted in the Clinic's medical
mission.
4) The Clinic's return can be earned on a long term
basis, but commitment to the long term goal of an
improved physical environment was unclear. [181
Both McGovern and May felt the Clinic was willing to take on
the risk of the hotel, but not the housing. They cited the
Clinic's prior experience with the Clinic Inn as a cause.
The Clinic Inn was a hotel built in the 1970's on
Clinic-owned land leased to a hotel management company. The
hotel was mismanaged and run down. It became a, "hot pillow
hotel." The Clinic was forced to buy out the hotel management
company and take on the management with BSHC. The bad memory
lingered. (191
As David Goss of Clinitec reviewed the project, he
concurred that contol was the issue. The site was on the
edge of the Clinic's campus which made control especially
important. The Clinic was concerned that if the developer
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did not meet proforma rents, they would do whatever was
necessary to lease the units. The hotel lease had an 80 year
term and Clinitec would hold the lease with BSHC to manage
it. Forest City took a risk with this project. While Goss
thought that the Clinic would be risk averse, he discovered
later that the Clinic would assume greater risk in exchange
for greater control over the project's destiny. Sacrifice of
control was the risk the clinic would not assume. [201
Ed Pelavin, of Forest City Dillon, concurred with
McGovern, May, and Goss, in his assessment of the project.
He also raised the point that revisions in the tax laws,
anticipated with the Tax Reform of 1986, changed the
developer's position on the project. Tax benefits, which
would have been valuable if the project generated negative
cash flow in its early years, would be less valuable or
possibly eliminated. Therefore, the downside of the real
estate venture was considerably different. The developer's
assessment of the risks involved in the market rate
apartments was increased. (211
Two major issues are illustrated in the Euclid Hotel
case. The first is the complexity of structuring a
transaction between an institution and a private developer
which allows each party to achieve its objectives while
giving both parties the desired degree of comfort with regard
to risk, return, and control. The second is the issue of
market uncertainty which may have been a strong motive behind
the termination of the original venture. Both of these
issues and three others will be analyzed in the following
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chapter.
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Chapter Four
DOAN CENTER, INC.:
TiE NONPROFIT & PLAYER IM TJiE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
The Doan Center project provides many illustrations of
nonprofits' involvement in the development process, in
different roles and on different levels. This portion of the
thesis will focus on the role of one nonprofit: Doan Center,
Inc. (DCI).
DCI is a nonprofit corporation established to carry out
predevelopment planning and analysis, broker possible
development projects with private developers, and in some
instances take on the developer's role. To date, the tasks
of DCI have focused on predevelopment. In its predevelopment
work, DCI is acting as a quasi-public agency. As the project
enters phases beyond predevelopment, the role of DCI will
have to adapt and conform to meet the challenges of the next
phases: approvals, financing, construction, leasing, and
eventually management.
This section of the thesis will explore the issues which
DCI faced in the Euclid Hotel project and continues to face
as other components come into play. These current challenges
draw on the information presented in the Background and
Current Status descriptions of the project, and particularly
on the Euclid Hotel case. The preceding chapters described
the project and its context. This section will be more
analytic, examining Doan Center, Inc. as a player in the real
estate development process. The central question here is:
What are the implications of nonprofit participation in the
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development process?
There is a distinction between a nonprofit organization
like DCI and a nonprofit institution like the Cleveland
Clinic Foundation. By definition, an institution implies a
well established organization with longevity. The term
institution can also imply an entity with special
significance to a society or culture. Although the Cleveland
Clinic probably meets both definitions, with its established,
significant role in the Cleveland area; Doan Center, Inc.
does not. These distinctions are not made to diminish DCI's
importance; but to point out how well established, large, and
complex the Clinic is in relation to DCI. Also, because DCI
works so closely with the Clinic and other institutions,
including city government, the perception of DCI as an
institutional arm or representative exists in some people's
minds. For clarity, the two entities will be kept separate
in this analysis. When the Clinic's role has implications
for DCI's role, these will be acknowledged.
Another distinction to make at this point is the
difference between constraints and barriers. These two terms
can be used to describe the degree to which an issue might
restrict or block a project. Several issues will be raised
in this analysis and an attempt will be made to distinguish
between those which are constraints and those which are
actual barriers to the project's progress or the problem's
resolution. Making a distinction by degree of what truly
blocks the project and what might just constrain it will be
an important part of the judgment calls that go into the
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strategic planning for the project's success.
From the challenges enumerated at the end of the last
section, five general categories of issues are apparent:
1) Market/Economic
2) Political
3) Organization/Management
4) Institutional Implications
5) Site and Physical Issues
In examining each of these categories, the objective is to
illustrate and analyze the complexities of nonprofit
participation in the real estate development process.
The issues generally outlined above will be examined in
greater depth. Strategic options will be set out in relation
to these issues and DCI's objectives. Conditions necessary
to implement these options will be explored. Finally,
criteria for measuring success will be defined. As
stated in the Euclid Hotel/Apartment RFP: "Any urban
development process needs four elements to be successful--
leadership, land, market, and financing." [1]
MARKET/ECONOMIC ISSUES
Generally, urban redevelopment projects face market
related issues that are very difficult to quantify. Although
the economic context can be examined in terms of employment,
population, and income trends, the submarket in which the
project will exist is often nonexistent at the time that
development is being considered. Therefore, calculations of
land valuation, comparable rents, projected sales, etc. are
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highly speculative. This tremendous market uncertainty makes
such projects highly risky. At Doan Center, the
institutional presence is one of the major value creators for
land in the Doan Center area.
To illustrate this issue, the Cleveland market generally
was not found to be healthy for hotel use, as occupancy rates
in the city average 55%. [2] However, DCI believes the Doan
Center area may have a market for hotel use because of the
captive audience provided by Clinic users. The proposed
efficiency hotel suites had the benefit of testing the market
through the existing University Center Motel. The unknown
markets, particularly those uses priced competitively with
suburban locations, raise apprehension on the part of
participants. For example, the question of whether market
rate housing can really lease out at this location is still
an unknown. Projects nearby, like Lexington Village, rent at
subsidized rates below suburban markets. The Mayfield
Triangle project, to be developed on land controlled by UCI,
will be a good test for the market that Doan Center wants to
capture.
Even if countless market studies were produced, some
elements of the market would still be unknown. The market
issue is not so much a barrier as it is a constraint. The
constraint is significant because developers and their
lenders will seek subsidies or guarantees to limit their
risks. Given the uncertainty of some of Doan Center's
components, private developers will also seek higher rewards
to assume the burden of market risks.
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At a broader level market issues relate to economic
forces. In the case of Doan Center, the regional economy is
stable, the city is declining, and the immediate area faces
losses in population and income but has growth in employment.
The retail, residential, hotel, and office markets depend on
different aspects of the area's economy. For example, a
stable regional economy with increasing expendable income may
prove beneficial for a specialty retail use which draws on
secondary market areas. Also, the interrelationships between
markets impact the mixed use nature of Doan Center. While
low rents in the city and suburbs make new housing
development difficult, the fact that a smaller percentage of
household income is spent on rent can benefit a retail
market.
POLITICAL ISSUES
Political issues will be explored on three levels: the
city, the community, and the politics internal to DCI's
membership. In general, the city of Cleveland supports the
project to the extent it can. The city is generally
pro-development, particularly for this part of its Target
Area. The city is most likely pro-Clinic, considering that
the Clinic has a large employment base that generates
municipal tax revenues. In a city which wants to stimulate
(leverage) economic growth, on a site which contains so much
institutional land held by a growing institution; the
political barriers which might otherwise block a development
project are lowered to the point where they may be
constraints.
In terms of constraints, the city has fiscal constraints
which impact Doan Center. For Doan Center, the city has not
directly provided leadership, staff, and control of this
project directly. The city, in a way, has not shown the
initiative taken by many cities seeking redevelopment.
Therefore, it gives support where it can, such as Mayor
Voinovich's desire to have groups like DCI transcend his
administration. It also gives support in the form of seeking
UDAG's, incorporating the DC master plan into Civic Vision,
setting aside funds for site engineering, and generally
keeping an open door and direct contact with the DCI
leadership. This freedom and independence which DCI has in
relation to the City, while still attaining the City's
support, can be a true advantage to DCI.
The city of Cleveland has numerous examples of private
nonprofit initiative for roles more commonly played by city
governments elsewhere. The fact that the funding and part of
the staff time needed to produce a comprehensive city plan
like Civic Vision came from the private sector is a prime
example of this. Fortunately for the citizens of Greater
Cleveland, these private sector counterparts for public
sector functions have managed to serve some of the city's
more critical needs.
The city may not presently create a barrier to this
project. Later, however, when approvals are required, and
the discretion of City Council (or the School Board) is
sought, this situation may change. The local city
-66-
councilmen's constituents are residents, not institutions.
As the City Council or neighborhood groups become more
directly involved with or affected by the project, obstacles
to the project's components may emerge.
On the neighborhood level, the project may not yet have
satisfied some of the objectives sought by the local groups
in 1985. Some contend that direct participation in the
decision making process has not yet been achieved. Equity
participation was also a goal, not yet realized. Councilmen
in abutting wards may be anti-Clinic. The Clinic, by
employing 15-20% of the population (3] in adjacent
neighborhoods, may be able to undermine a strong anti-Clinic
constituency. DCI's concern is not merely with the Clinic
and the Clinic's image in the neighborhood, but also with
integrating neighborhood oriented uses into the project.
Politically, if the community shopping center is perceived as
desirable by the neighborhoods, and as more housing is built
the project may succeed in reducing opposition to other uses
which would not spin off neighborhood amenities. This aspect
of the political issue relates to an economic issue. If the
neighborhood groups see DCI's institutional membership and
the master plan's focus as having a positive impact on their
existence, DCI will meet less resistance. By contrast, if
the perception is that taxpayers' money is subsidizing a
project which does not directly meet the community's needs, a
great degree of convincing about spin off or trickle down
potential will be required. [41
Internally, the politics of DCI are somewhat complex.
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Many participants perceived that rivalry among the major
institutions might be an underlying barrier to the project's
success. This is quite possible. Until an actual project
requiring cooperation among institutions is put on the
table, one can only speculate. Rivalry may be more in terms
of competition for patients or physicians. A development
proposal which enhances all institutions' ability to attract
patients could be viewed favorably by both. Because the
Clinic and University Circle institutions bring different
assets to the Doan Center project (one an expanding
worker/visitor population and the other location rich in
amenities); there is great potential in trading between these
assets. If there is a power struggle in terms of project
control, however, barriers can develop. The respective
institutions' objectives regarding control may have a common
base. Both can benefit from an improved environment in the
Doan Center area. One has more directly at stake in terms of
control over land holdings. The institutions may also have
common goals about desired uses, (i.e. conference center).
Cooperation may also be more economical in terms of redundant
services like security, buses, parking, signage, etc. once
the Doan Center area emerges as a true asset to the
University Circle area.
Some of the participants interviewed sensed that
inter-institutional problems were minor in terms of the Doan
Center project. The political problems within Doan Center,
Inc. seem to be more focused on DCI and the Clinic (including
the Clinic being a "more equal" member of the nine member
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board), and will be covered under the organization/
management issues section which follows.
ORGANIZATION/MANAGEMENT ISSUES
One of the major issues which arose from the Euclid
Hotel project was the relationship between Doan Center Inc.
and one of its member institutions, the Cleveland Clinic
Foundation. This issue of relationship between the DCI staff
and its board will be a continuing problem as components of
the project are developed. DCI has a nine member board,
composed primarily of institutions. However, one board
member has more clout and more at risk than any of the others
whenever a development proposal involves Clinic-held land.
The Clinic, like DCI itself, has a vested interest in some
development projects and this will continue to create a
conflict between its role as board member and its role as
landowner. Unless DCI's leadership can neutralize this
conflict, the problem will persist. (UCI may also have
inequality among its institutional members, but seems to
maintain its power by managing the landbank for its area.)
With the Euclid Hotel, one of DCI's roles was to act as
broker between the institutional landowner/user and the
private developer. Unlike a typical broker, DCI also had a
vested interest in the proposed use, density, and design of
the project. The original RFP presented DCI, CCF, and Bolton
Square Hotel Corp. (BSHC) as a unified group making the
offering. The DCI objectives were more related to the market
rate residential component, while the Clinic and BSHC were
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interested in the 100 unit residential hotel. At some point
the three parties diverged, or perhaps the unity was never
truly achieved. When the project did not proceed, the DCI
staff's major concern was for its own credibility with the
larger community, and more importantly, its empowerment--the
"Paper Tiger" problem. In situations where the Clinic is a
major stakeholder (both landowner and building user), the
Clinic may continue to call the shots. If DCI is not to
become a puppet with the Clinic pulling its strings,
strategies which decrease the Clinic's impact on components
must be derived. (Perhaps the Clinic should not be expected
to take a risk position beyond that of ground lessor or
building lessee on projects where the Clinic holds the land.
options which can be viable with or without the Clinic's
participation could be pursued on land not held by the
Clinic, if that is ever possible.)
The problem may not have been that DCI was out of touch
with the true concerns of the Clinic. The Clinic itself may
have been uncertain about its own concerns. From Goss'
viewpoint, the Clinic itself initially saw the issue as risk
but shifted the issue to control as they pulled out of the
Euclid Hotel Project. Risk and control are interrelated on
real estate development projects. Even if control were the
obstacle, there are means within a ground lease or joint
venture agreement to delegate control among the parties so
that the Clinic's concerns could be alleviated. From the
information available, there was no attempt to reexamine the
ground lease agreement between the Clinic and Forest City in
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order to give both parties comfort about the control issue.
In a way, both parties seemed content to let the project
drop. Market concerns led the developer to perceive that the
lost opportunity was not too great, or at best, unknown.
One management issue which is apparent from the case
study is the confusion about the role of Doan Center, Inc.
Both DCI and the Clinic share this problem of multiplicity of
roles. DCI may be taking on a role that the public sector
normally plays as a redevelopment authority. DCI may be
taking on the role that the private sector plays as a private
developer. In either case, DCI is also playing the role of
mediator between its board members, the public sector, and
the private sector. one might also question its role as a
mediator.
From the amount of consensus building that has been
done, one would perceive the Doan Center development as
highly controversial. But the controversy, at this point is
not completely clear. In a classic urban redevelopment
project reconciling the city's interests and the developer's
interests would be a constant challenge. This type of
tension is not yet apparent for the components of the Doan
Center project. Perhaps, the staff at DCI has been so
successful at table setting and getting the parties to buy
into the project that they have avoided the conflicting
interests that normally emerge when a development project is
undertaken. It is more likely, controversial projects have
not yet gotten to the point where opposition would emerge.
Also, the City may be so eager to see some economic and
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physical revitalization in Doan Center that it will not
jeopardize or alienate private developers or institutions.
It is fair to ask whether the relationship between DCI
and the Clinic is working as well as it could be. The lesson
learned from the Euclid Hotel project may be that the
Clinic's actions are unpredictable. Yet, one predictable
aspect of the Clinic's reactions is that it will put its
interests for environmental control before the interests of
realizing projects which maximize gains for the Doan Center
project. If this is the "bottom line", then DCI needs to
have a more direct line into the Clinic's power structure,
through its own leadership, via Herb Strawbridge. Another
option would be for DCI to start packaging projects in ways
that would make the Clinic's alternatives to buying into the
projects less desirable than if they do. Is that an
impossible task? Which deal structures would give the Clinic
what it wants and DCI what it wants?
As each component of the Doan Center project evolves,
DCI, the Clinic, and other board members will have different
objectives about control, risk, reward, and timing.
Tailoring the ownership and management structures on a
project by project basis will be required.
One might also question the Clinic's motives in
participating in the Doan Center process. Has the Clinic
really bought into the master plan concept or is it providing
funding and membership as an extension of its desire to be in
control? If the latter is the case, the project will only
move ahead on the Clinic's terms. DCI will need to develop
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an excellent sense about these terms in advance, or take a
trial and error approach.
DCI's role seems to straddle the position of planner and
developer. One might wonder whether the skills of
identifying concerns and building consensus are transferrable
to the next stages of development. Although these skills are
needed all the way along--the same people may not necessarily
have the attributes required to strategically drive this
project into reality. One set of skills is more detail
oriented; the other is broad brush. Perhaps the best
resolution is to leave the former skills to the professionals
and the latter to the lay leadership. Also, there may be
instances where complete consensus is not required or not
attainable. The concern for achieving a unified backing to
every project may obstruct the ability to see some projects
realized. DCI's ability to adapt its role to each component
and phase of the project can be an asset for a project like
Doan Center. Evidently, DCI has begun doing this. As it has
entered into a phase where marketing projects to developers
on a financial basis will be required, DCI has begun
preparing proforma analyses from a developer's perspective.
The leadership, visionary and driving force may be
lacking at this point. While the foundations laid by DCI
during predevelopment may provide a very sturdy base on which
to build the project, some leader may be needed who has the
drive to implement the project. Alternatively, this may be a
strategic move; reserving the strength of DCI's leadership
for key components. Selecting key projects to push and going
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slow at first in order to go fast later may be the correct
tactic on a project of this type. The slow, incremental
approach to the project may be more realistic, given its
scale and local market conditions. However, the Mixed Use
Component is still the keystone piece that can radically
transform the area's image. Its successful realization is
essential to realizing DCI's objectives.
INSTITUTIONAL PARTICIPATION ISSUES
Institutional participation raises some conflicting
issues for the DCI. DCI's board is primarily composed of
institutions, each with its own mission. The institutions
bring many assets and amenities to the project, and at the
same time bring some liabilities and constraints. The assets
include an expanding employment base (which others can
capture), physical expansion, cultural elements valued by the
public, established track records, longevity, ability to
extend time horizon for returns, good will (to the extent
that mission and public perception confirm that), and
commitment to the location. The liabilities include
interinstitutional competition for consumer base, physical
expansion seen as takeover or fortress, inaccessibility to
some of the public sector, inertia, multiplicity of roles,
complex organization and management structure, public image
problems carried over from the past, and desire to control
surroundings which can override or confict with project
goals, and a general ambivalence with regard to real estate
development.
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In addition to these, there is another factor which
makes institutional participation unique. Measurements of
success are often unclear and differ from institution to
institution. To some extent, the private sector can be
measured by its profit margins or stockholder's dividends.
To some extent, the public sector can be evaluated by its
electorate. The nonprofit institution has less clear
indicators or evaluators of its performance. The nonprofit
does not have the same "bottom line" interest as its private
counterpart; although it is heavily influenced by fiscal
constraints. The nonprofit also does not have the feedback
on achievement of mission that public officials sometimes do.
The nonprofit institution functions in both realms but has
far more ambiguous performance criteria.
Another factor which makes institutional presence
complex is the distinction between its for-profit and
nonprofit ventures. The tax exempt status, which may be a
bonus, also carries restrictions on what pursuits are for and
not for profit. The IRS definition is ambiguous. The
Clinic's policy is to be cautious, by relegating any
for-profit pursuits to the realm of its for-profit
subsidiary, Clinitec, Inc. With regard to real estate
ventures, this issue has been the subject of debate recently.
For example, churches which sell land holdings or air rights
under their tax exempt shield have been the focus of public
criticism. (5]
When a nonprofit institution achieves financial success,
as the Clinic has, conflicts become even more evident. The
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Clinic is approached to contribute capital or tax exempt
financing sources to real estate endeavors, while at the same
time it is approaching foundations for grant support on
mission-related projects. The appeal of tax exempt
financing, or the asset of undertaking a joint venture with
no need for tax benefits, has been diminished with changes
brought on by the Tax Reform of 1986.
More specifically, in terms of real estate development,
institutions like the Clinic have conflicts about being
perceived as real estate developers. Development clearly is
not its business, nor its area of expertise. The land
banking undertaken over the last decade has left the Clinic
with more land than its expansion capacity calls for. The
Clinic is faced with a choice of holding or selling its land,
and prefers to hold because of the control that landownership
provides. Also, as the Euclid Hotel RFP stated, returns from
real estate development ventures can help offset some of the
financial limitiations that reform in the health care
industry has produced. Development of its own facilities is
acceptable to the institution. Staying out of the real
estate business entirely may not be a realistic alternative
for an institution like the Clinic.
Risk and return take on different meanings when an
institution is involved in real estate development. Positive
returns on a project like the Euclid Hotel were not a
requirement for the Clinic. A project which could break even
was the expectation. At the same time the Clinic's aversion
to risk meant that there were limitations on what the Clinic
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would guarantee or subsidize in order to achieve a break even
financial status. Non-institutional real estate development
is not a priority for the Clinic, unless control of its
surroundings is jeopardized. The Clinic's desire to build
housing for its employees has also diminished in priority
since the original stakeholder analysis was undertaken.
Now, the Clinic's position is to leave that problem to
private sector market forces. If there is a demand for this
type of housing, the Clinic believes a private developer will
satisfy it.
This raises another issue, that of compatibility between
institutions and private developers. Although DCI will act
as broker between the two, that can be a difficult task when
one party perceives itself as incompatible with the other.
The Clinic believes that private developers ask the
institution to bear more risk than they should. The Clinic
sees itself as bringing the value to the location, being the
attraction to the developer. Though the Clinic understands
that economic forces will require all parties to "go the
extra mile" in a venture like Doan Center, the Clinic
believes it has already done so by providing risk capital for
the predevelopment study. The Clinic is not yet willing to
provide funding or guarantees requested by private
developers, other than commitments to cover its own use of a
facility. [6]
Private developers and institutions also have
conflicting time frames. A developer may perceive time as
money, particularly if a project is highly leveraged. An
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institution like the Clinic has a longer time horizon.
Though this difference can often be the basis for
complementary partnerships, it can also be a constraint,
particularly when the development project is risky and
returns are long awaited.
Decision making is another problem. An institution is
not structured in a way which allows individuals to act
autonomously when representing the institution. Some
developers are structured to decide and act quickly, as this
can make or break a deal in a healthy market.
Some doctors see real estate as a threat. Hospital and
clinic boards may not have many real estate development
professionals who are familiar with the concepts of real
estate finance. The Clinic conducts its real estate
acquisitions on a cash basis. It issued debt for the first
time in 1983, to fund the expansion of its facilities. [71
This approach may not be compatible with the financing
concepts used by private developers.
Institutions, by definition, are not quick to move or
change. DCI has a continuous challenge in rallying one major
stakeholder and all its other institutional board members for
action on a project like Doan Center.
SITE/PHYSICAL ISSUES
In comparison to the issues enumerated above, these
issues are more straightforward. The one exception is the
site currently being considered for the Mixed Use Component.
This site has both physical and political problems. As each
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component is activated, and the site assembly process begins;
site issues will constantly tie into institutional issues.
Land control is one of the Clinic's major interests. Even
for parcels not controlled by the Clinic, the Clinic's
interests will play a part. As uses come into play which do
not necessarily coincide with the Clinic's agenda, the Clinic
has the ability to buy the land and exert site control.
Without buying the land, the Clinic can also exert its
influence as a DCI board member. Another issue for some of
the parcels will be involving the city and other neighbors in
site assembly. This can be a very sensitive issue, when
parcels are owned by numerous individuals, each with his/her
own agendas. If the city exercises its powers of eminent
domain, the ultimate use of the site must serve a public
purpose, and the landholders must be compensated.
STRATEGIC OPTIONS
In simple terms, strategies for accomplishing the
goals of the Doan Center project can fall into two
alternative approaches. The first is to take a strong master
plan development approach where the whole is perceived to be
greater than the sum of the parts. Every component is viewed
in terms of how well it achieves the overriding objective: to
get the master plan implemented. Strategies then evolve
which select or sacrifice certain pieces for the good of the
whole. With this approach, leadership and staff take a
strong position to achieve a single minded final result. The
model for this would be a redevelopment authority, empowered
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by legislation which gives it the right to carry out a
master plan. Another model might be a master developer who
brokers each project's developers for a fee and acts as the
unified force to achieve the master plan in the arena of the
private market place.
The second approach is to let the master plan adapt as
components come into play. Every piece is seen as equally
valuable, and each piece contributes to the general progress
of urban redevelopment. The master plan concept transforms
as each component comes on line. This planning concept is
more organic and incremental than the first. This approach
also allows for more participation by all the stakeholders in
a more egalitarian setting. The approach taken by the DCI
staff thus far seems to fall into this second category.
The question now is which approach best suits the
objectives of Doan Center given the issues the project and
staff face as outlined above. The political arena is
somewhat complacent and pro-development. The market/economic
conditions are weak on a large scale but on a submarket scale
more viable, although risky. The organizational conditions
are complex because of the imbalance of the board and the
simulation of public sector roles by private nonprofit
players. The physical/site issues are not overly problematic
(except for the mixed use component). Finally, the
institutional participation brings a third level of
complexity to the more common public/private relationship.
Given all of these issues, which strategic approach best
suits the project at this point? Possibly both. Momentum is
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key in urban redevelopment. For the type of transformation
that Doan Center wants to accomplish, an Initial impact that
provides the impetus for other changes makes sense. Once
this first step is achieved, then the second strategy comes
into play. There is not yet a controversy to mediate because
the controversial piece has not yet been proposed. The mixed
use component could be the controversial piece. Currently,
development is either taking a community-based or
institutional route, dictated by market forces. The piece
that may be most uncertain in the market, but most necessary
to achieve the linkage and turnaround required needs to be
formally proposed. The strategy then follows the first
route. Once that piece is put on the table, the second
strategy comes into play.
Because DCI has pursued consensus building upfront and
has gone slow first in order to avoid obstacles later, the
action must now be set in motion. In some cases, the market
itself would be the catalyst. In others, a city agency
working in conjunction with a private developer would take on
this task. In this case, the private developer needs to be
brought in, unless EDC fits this role. DCI will, in effect
act as the redevelopment authority, with the Clinic and other
board members as its city government. Then the project
becomes analogous to an urban redevelopment plan, controlled
by a redevelopment authority, undertaken on city owned land.
The Clinic has to be behind this project, to the extent that
they are willing to assume risks (normally assumed by the
city) in order to see their surrounding environment
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transformed. If the clinic is truly not willing or ready to
put much more at stake, DCI has the difficult task of trying
to work around a major constraint. If projects are only
possible on land that the Clinic does not control, then DCI
should explore mechanisms to take land control itself.
One such mechanism would be the UCI landbank approach,
but this requires additional funding beyond DCI's operating
budget. Another mechanism would be the central nonprofit
development corporation now being planned by Cleveland
Tomorrow. This corporation would utilize Cleveland
Tomorrow's access to funds and private business support in
order to facilitate the goals of smaller nonprofit
development entities like DCI. This plan is still in the
conceptual stage, but may eventually be a feasible option for
DCI.
Finally, DCI's best option may be to continue working
with the Clinic by structuring ground lease deals where the
Clinic does not compound its risk as landowner with other
development risks. Some institutions, with significant
clout, are able to command unsubordinated ground leases.
Turnkey buildings by private developers who are not looking
to the Clinic for subsidies, loans, or guarantees, seem to be
acceptable to the Clinic. These buildings, like the one
proposed by Tishman-Speyer Medic, are dictated by market
demand. When the Clinic is ground lessor on projects with
more market risk, DCI may have to look elsewhere to fill
financing gaps created by the short term market. An
alternative structure would be for the Clinic to contribute
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its land as an equity partner. Joint ventures which provide
guaranteed or preferred returns could be set up. While the
developer might be looking for its return in the early years,
the Clinic may be willing to defer a return to the project's
later years.
The Mixed Use Component is a good framework within which
strategies can be tested. The staff has accomplished its
role as table setters and much of the predevelopment study is
finished. The problem now seems to be getting a project
proposal assembled and put on the table. At the same time,
some controversial site issues need to be resolved. Although
market forces would sometimes be the catalyst for a
development to proceed, with urban revitalization, this
catalyst is often absent. Another catalyst would be
leadership with vision. DCI may have this leadership with
Herb Strawbridge, given his ability to attract Rouse's
interest.
EDC is temporarily on hold, leaving site resolution to
the DCI staff, whose local connections will be utilized for
this effort. DCI seems to be in the process of assessing the
site barriers and alternatives. Both parties recognize that
the site will be a delicate issue and feel that two years for
completion of site assembly is realistic. In this case, DCI
will be the implementor and make judgments about the most
feasible proposal and a strategy to carry it forward. As
Dixon Harvey of EDC saw it, there won't be many chances to
make this component work. Careful strategic planning and
sensitivity toward the major stakeholders will be crucial to
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the component's success. Fallback options need to be
generated which would phase the use of the site, in case
complete site assembly cannot be achieved. At the same time,
DCI has to convince the institutions of the project's
validity and solicit guarantees for the hotel/conference
center use.
DCI is balancing the interests of many parties on this
component. Unlike the Euclid Hotel, land is controlled in
part by the School Board, in part by the city, in part by UCI
and by other private interests. None of the proposed mixed
use site is under Clinic control. The Clinic's role will be
as a potential project user. This may alleviate some of the
constraints DCI faced with the Euclid Hotel. However, far
more complex multi-party agreements will be required. DCI
can utilize its past experience as a broker to these
agreements to find the best fit for this project. In order
to exert more control and authority in this implementation
role, DCI and UCI might explore a joint venture to take
control of the site, prior to its disposition.
CRITERIA FOR SUCCESS
DCI will constantly be checking whether the project is
meeting its original objectives in a timely manner. In
addition, the following general set of criteria can provide a
self-test as to whether a private, nonprofit entity works:[8]
1) Is it empowered?
2) Does the staff have ability and leadership?
3) Does it operate as close as possible to the way its
for-profit counterpart operates, in this case a private
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developer?
4) Does it have credibility with the key players?
5) Does it have flexibility to get grants?
6) Can it access sources of funding?
Examined in terms of each of these criteria, DCI may be
struggling on empowerment (1), operating mode (3), and
funding (6).
Generally, this analysis raises the following questions:
Can a private nonprofit take on the role of developer,
especially when its board is institutionally based? Is the
insititutional nature of Doan Center's board an asset or a
liability? These questions will be addressed in the
following chapter.
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Chapter Five
GENERAL ISSUES RAISED B-1 =H DOAN CENTER CASE:
IMPLICATIONS EQ SIMILAR NONPROFITS
One of the original objectives of this thesis was to
examine what makes nonprofits distinct as they participate in
the real estate development process. These distinctions
include their position with respect to the public and private
sectors, their missions, and their attitudes about risk,
return, and time horizon. Although there is no typical
nonprofit player, just as there is no typical for-profit
developer, a comparison between the two types can shed light
on the unique aspects of nonprofit players.
The case of Doan Center and specifically the Euclid
Hotel project illustrate many of the issues relevant to this
question about nonprofits. While nonprofits bring many
assets to the real estate process, they also bring an added
layer of complexity. This is particularly true when
nonprofits interact with the public and private sector. Some
circumstances raised in this study are unique to Doan Center,
and its political and economic context. These prevent the
transfer of all conclusions about this nonprofit's role to
that of other projects in other markets.
This chapter will stress those general lessons in the
Doan Center experience that might apply to nonprofits in
other contexts. Issues which are unique to the Cleveland
market, and an urban redevelopment project like Doan Center,
will be noted as well.
Nonprofits have a special status that creates both
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advantages and disadvantages when these entities undertake
real estate development projects. Their special status is
derived from the power structures of their boards, the
missions and objectives which drive them, their public image,
their internal organizations, and the special relationships
they cultivate with city governments and lenders.
Doan Center, Inc.'s board has primarily institutional
representation, including many of the project area's
stakeholders. In turn, the boards of the participating
institutions themselves include some of the more powerful and
influential people in Cleveland. There is also a lot of
cross-fertilization among boards. For example, Ken
McGovern and David Goss sit on the Board of New Cleveland-6,
and McGovern is also on the Board of Midtown Corridor. Jerry
Jarrett, who is the CEO of Ameritrust bank, is also on the
Clinic's Board, a member of the board of trustees of UCI, and
chairperson of the Trustees Committee of the Cleveland
Foundation. The Cleveland Clinic is an associate member
institution of University Circle, Inc.; while many of UCI's
largest member institutions sit on the board of DCI. The
network of private nonprofit institutions, corporations, and
foundations in the City of Cleveland is very tightly knit.
Nonprofit organizations are unique because they usually
strive to provide a public good. In this respect, their
missions often run parallel to government bodies. Nonprofits
with a very broad public agenda, like DCI, can still restrict
their missions to certain aspects of the public good. In
this respect they diverge from government bodies. Nonprofits
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seem to occupy a middle zone between the public sector (whose
obligation is to the citizens who support them) and the
private sector (whose obligation is to shareholders or
private individuals). The nonprofits have a duty to their
boards, their sponsors, their missions, and a perceived or
real obligation to the general public.
The missions of nonprofit organizations are often what
give them special status in the eyes of the public. Although
the public does not directly choose the direction of
nonprofits the way that voters choose elected officials;
the public does seem to hold these nonprofits in special
esteem. This is especially true when the missions that give
nonprofits their reason for being coincide with the desires
of certain public sectors. Generally, nonprofits may be
viewed with less skepticism than private businesses
or real estate developers.
Finally, because nonprofits do have a commitment to some
aspect of the public good, the nonprofits form special
relationships with local government bodies. Often, the
nonprofits are in a position to assist with the objectives of
local government. This is definitely the case with DCI.
Even when missions do not overlap with the desires of
government, nonprofits may still have more direct access and
favorable treatment by government. Nonprofit institutions
probably illustrate this best. The longevity and stability
of nonprofit institutions make them permanent fixtures in
their communities. Although they do not vote, their presence
is felt and often a source of power. When an institution is
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as important to a local economy and tax base as the Cleveland
Clinic is to Cleveland; its influence at City Hall cannot be
underestimated. Also, the power structure of the nonprofit
boards can imply political influence in greater force than a
single private corporation.
These factors often give nonprofits advantages as far as
public review and approval, access to public or tax exempt
funding, favorable financing rates, and priority on public
agendas. Another major advantage for large scale projects is
that institutions are often landbankers and are willing to
execute ground leases. Ground leases can greatly reduce
predevelopment risk. The costs of site assembly and carrying
costs for the land are avoided while development approvals
are sought. Also, initial land costs are amortized over the
term of the lease. These financial considerations are
important for large master plan projects.
These advantages can be somewhat theoretical. A major
factor which can alter these advantages is the relationship
the nonprofit has with the local community. Also, market
forces which may create pro-development or no-growth
constituencies will impact the reception a nonprofit gets
from the community. When political and economic climates are
overlayed onto the situation, even a very influential, public
oriented institution, can run into the numerous obstacles of
the real estate development process.
The advantages enumerated above can also be
disadvantages, to some extent, as nonprofits deal in the
world of real estate. The boards which provide a power
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structure for institutions also tend to have complex
organizational structures. The Clinic is a group practice of
500 physicians, run by a Board of Governors and a Board of
Trustees. Also, real estate development is not usually the
primary mission of the organizations, nor is it the area of
expertise of the decision making bodies. Keeping an arm's
length from participation in the real estate world is a
common tendency for nonprofits.
Nonprofit missions are not usually real estate related.
If the mission happens to be oriented to real estate
development, like Doan Center Inc.'s is, this direction will
often be tempered by associated goals which private
developers do not encounter. In the case of Doan Center, the
development is extremely risky and profit is not the major
motivator. When missions are not real estate oriented, as in
the Clinic's case, the attitude is often that real estate
development is not the business, objective, or expertise of
the institution. Therefore, development of noninstitutional
facilities takes a very low priority.
The desire to maintain a positive public image will make
nonprofits very careful about selecting partners for real
estate ventures. In the cases where real estate is not
mission related, joint ventures are often necessary because
the nonprofits do not have in-house expertise. The tendency
for nonprofits to be held under public scrutiny, and for many
observers to have higher expectations about their products
than they would for the private sector, creates a liability
out of an asset. As for relationships with local
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governments, the influence created by the longevity of
nonprofit institutions also sets performance criteria to a
higher level. When governments are open to deal making or
negotiated development, nonprofits may not have the freedom
to pursue this option in the way their private counterparts
do. However, of the four factors described: power structure;
missions; public image; and special status with city
government; the last factor probably has far more advantages
than disadvantages.
Another major focus of this study was to examine the
relationship between nonprofits and their private sector
counterparts--the real estate developers. One hypothesis
might be that the less institutional the nonprofit is, the
closer it comes to acting like its private sector
counterpart. There are some very institutional development
corporations, just as there are some very entrepreneurial
institutions; so this theory is not necessarily valid.
A second hypothesis is that a complementary relationship
between a nonprofit and a private developer is the optimal
situation. Each party can contribute and execute those
aspects which they do best. In the abstract, this is the
rationale behind public/private partnerships. In reality,
the public sector and private sector do not necessarily
divide up the work according to optimal efficiency.
Public/private partnerships usually take on projects with
greater challenges than either sector could meet separately.
Both sectors must pursue every option within their respective
domains just to get the projects to work. This model seems
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to fit the Doan Center project. In the case of Doan
Center, the partnership seems to be three-way. The model is
more a public/private/nonprofit or quasi-public/private
partnership.
To understand the potential complementary relationships
that can be cultivated between nonprofits and private
developers, one must look at the following factors: risk
profile, reward objective, time horizon, and tax status.
These factors establish some of the parameters for
structuring successful joint ventures between the two
players.
Parallels exist between the more common partnership
structures of private developers and institutional lenders,
like pension funds and insurance companies. In these
partnerships, the lender is typically risk averse, willing to
forego high yields in order to balance risk aversion, able to
maintain an extended time horizon for returns, and often able
to utilize tax exempt funds. The developers, especially less
corporate ones, typically will bear a greater personal risk
provided rewards will compensate for this, have a shorter
time horizon for expected returns, and do not have tax exempt
status. For these reasons, developers often take on a
general partner's position, assuming more liability in
exchange for greater control over the operations and
management of a project. When lenders participate in cash
flow or residuals, they parallel the role of limited partner.
Some lenders assume an equity position, with convertible
loans.
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When organizations like DCI can utilize the large
spectrum of creative financing and complex deal structuring
techniques available, they can become very adept at tailoring
these ventures to the objectives of the participants. This
would be especially useful in resolving the Clinic's
objectives with regard to control. These deal structures
would be more complex than those outlined for the Euclid
Hotel (wholly owned, joint venture, and ground lease). Each
project component would require a unique deal structure, as
the positions and objectives of the parties involved would
vary.
A further understanding of the distinctions between
nonprofits and their private counterparts is necessary.
These distinctions relate to a nonprofit's position in the
spectrum between public and private sectors. The closer the
nonprofit falls to one end or the other will dictate which of
the following issues are applicable.
Many of the following issues were evident in the Euclid
Hotel Case and the general background of the Doan Center
project. When a nonprofit is an institution (like the
Clinic) or a quasi-public organization (like Doan Center),
its management structure tends to be more complex and
somewhat static in terms of decision making. This is due
partly to a fiduciary responsibility on the part of the
professional staff to Its board. The ability to act quickly
in order to maintain a competitive edge on a real estate
opportunity is somewhat restricted, unless the professional
staff has complete independence and responsibility for these
-93-
actions. When market conditions do not dictate quick
actions, this ability diminishes in importance. Private
developers are often viewed as having this attribute, but
this may also be a result of the marketplace. When the
tradeoff between risk and reward makes the consequences of
quick actions less burdensome (i.e., when the downside is
reduced by positive market forces), then the speed at which
decisions can be made is a desireable attribute.
Another issue which is apparent when a nonprofit is a
player, is performance measurement. Conventional measures of
success for private enterprise are often financial. Bottom
line may not be a criterion for a nonprofit entity that takes
on a project for motives other than purely financial ones.
Nonprofits tend to measure financial success at a break even
point far lower than their private counterpart's assessment
of acceptable returns. Projects which require gap financing,
other subsidy sources, and longer time horizons for positive
returns will have success measures that also relate to
achievement of non-financial objectives.
Funding sources for nonprofits (often other nonprofits
like foundations) do not necessarily perform due diligence
the way a private lender does. Once foundations disburse
grants, their best way to influence performance in the future
is to hold the grantee accountable when further grants are
sought. Sometimes, this factor can contribute to an inertia
that exists for nonprofits. Once they are established and
funded, the measures of productivity that would mean success
or failure for their private counterparts can be cushioned
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for the nonprofit. Less established nonprofits face funding
crises fairly often in their early years. To survive, they
must be adept at persuading funding sources of the legitimacy
of their existence. Because different parties brought into
the process will have different criteria for success, a
common set for all parties is difficult to establish and
maintain. A third issue, which arose in the Euclid Hotel
case and which will continue to challenge the Doan Center
project, is the effect of federal tax reform. Changes in the
tax laws have implications in terms of the attractiveness of
nonprofits to private partners.
1) Tax driven deals or those that relied heavily on tax
benefits in order to reduce the downside of a deal now
lose their appeal.
2) The gap between tax exempt financing and
conventional financing is decreased as income tax rates
are reduced, making tax exempt financing less
valuable.
3) Recent focus and debate over the use and abuse of
tax exempt status. Those endeavors which are not
related to the mission that creates the tax exempt
status are taxable. Property held by a nonprofit but
used for unrelated business is taxable. However, the
definition of unrelated business is sometimes vague and
puts nonprofits in the position of being self-policing
or scrutinized by the IRS.
This final point has more importance for nonprofits
participating in weaker real estate markets. In stronger
markets, where the land itself is a valuable asset, tax law
changes will not be as detrimental to nonprofits' appeal.
Projects like Doan Center, which involve large scale
redevelopment on land controlled, to a large extent, by a
nonprofit institution are an emerging prototype. In the case
of Doan Center, responsibility for master planning and
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predevelopment is in the hands of another nonprofit entity,
rather than the city or the landowner. This makes Doan
Center unique in some respects. Another aspect of the Doan
Center case which is unique is the market problem which
creates financing gaps. These gaps are caused by limited
revenues set by market rents that cannot cover construction
and land costs, even when land costs are fairly low.
Under different political and economic conditions, other
issues of nonprofit participation might arise. When a local
real estate market is thriving, institutional presence may
not be the only value creator for land holdings.
Institutions may find themselves holding valuable real estate
assets which were originally purchased for expansion or land
use control. Many universities, churches, and hospitals to a
lesser extent have been in this position. Examples of
institutional land holdings being developed for commercial
purposes include Princeton University's Forrestal Center [1],
M.I.T.'s University Park, Duke University [2], and the
College of William and Mary.
Valuable land holdings also bring the problem of
development pressures and strong local anti-development
constituencies. Institutional sponsorship of real estate
development projects under these circumstances can create
conflicts in terms of image and community relations. When
projects meet strong local resistance, a joint venture with a
private developer may prove useful in shielding the
institution from these conflicts. In turn, the institution
may offer established relationships with municipal government
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as a way of mitigating a difficult approval process.
The issues examined in this case and its analysis
provide a basic framework for understanding nonprofit
participation more broadly. Although nonprofits bring
additional complexity to the real estate development process,
they also bring many assets. The most complex and
advantageous of these is the objective to direct development
towards a greater public good.
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THE TARGET AREA
O The Downtown Area
1. Cleveland State University
2. St. Vincent Hospital
3. Nouvelle Espoire Housing
4. Cuyahoga Community College
5. East Tech
6. Lexington Village
7. Cleveland Playhouse
8. Garden Valley
9. Karamu House
D
10. U.S. Veterans Admin. Hospital
11. Mt. Sinai Hospital
12. Cleveland Health Museum
13. Cleveland Clinic
14. Art Museum
15. Severance Hall
16. Case Western Reserve University
17. University Hospitals
University Circle
I-
C
THE ACTION AREAS
The Target Area has thirteen-
activity centers, each of which serves
a distinct purpose. Seven areas are
residential neighborhoods: Buckeye, ADS
Central, Fairfax, Hough, Kinsman West,
Little Italy and Wade Park. The other six
are regional job-generating activity centers
whose impact is felt beyond the Thrget Area.
'iWo of these are industrial areas: Gladstone
and WECO; two are institutional complexes:
St. Vincent Quadrangle and University Circle,
and two serve multiple uses: Doan Center and
Midtown Corridor.
Each of these activity centers has unique charac-
teristics and has followed a different development path.
Each needs different publicly supported actions and
projects to stimulate the kind of investment desired by
its businesses and residents.
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TABLE 2.5
POPULATION TRENDS, DOAN CENI'ER AREA
Census Tract
University Circle
1187
1188
1191
1192
POPULATION
Change
1970 1980 1970-1980
4,498
3,533
1,479
3,294,
3,449
2,822
899
2,601
-23.2%
-20.1
-39.2
-21.0
HOUSEHOLDS
Change
1970 1980 1970-1980
1,133
1,396
559
923
788
1 ,450
324
893
-30.5%
3.9
-42.0
8.5
12,804 9,771 -23.7%
6,139
5,037
3,041
4,644
2,839
4,806
7,514
2,547
2,093
2,142
1,881
1,496
4,156
4,047,
-58.5%
-58.4
-29.6
-59.2
-47.3
-13.5
-46.1
34,020 18,362 -46.0%
3,911 3,455 -11.7%
1,634
1,355
777
1,602
1,026
1,982
2,791
835
645
729
846
665
1,968
1,752
-48.9%
-52.4%
-6.2
-47.2
-32.2
-0.7
-37.2
11,167 7,440 -33.4%
Fairfax**
1131
1132
1133
1134
1135
1136
Ttal
Total Doan Center
18,664 10,948 -41.3%
65,488 39,081 -40.3%
7,312 4,489 -38.6%
22,390 15,384 -31.3%
* Not including Census Tracts 1121, 1122, 1123, and 1127.
**Not including Census Tracts 1139 and 1141.
Source: U Bureau of the Census
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EXHIBIT J-2
Source: EDC Reconnaissance
Report
Ttal
114
1125
1126
1128
1129
1186
1189
Total
3,421
1,661
3,392
2,489
4,570
3,131
1,139
733
1,997
1,846
2,865
2,368
-66.7%
-55.9
-41.1
-25.8
-37.3
-24.4
1,683
834
1,237
853
1,611
1,094
554
393
854
690
1,673
925
-67.1%
-52.9
-31.0
-19.1
-33.4
-15.4
PERCENT POPULATION CIIANGE BY SPA
SPA POP. % POP. POP. % POP. POP. % POP. POP.
1970 CIIANGE 1980 CHANGE 1990 CHANGE 2000
1 ARCIIWOOU/I)ENISON 13299 -19.26 10738 -12.08 9441 -16.85 7850
2 BUCKFYE/SIIAKE:R 18496 -11.62 16347 -10.89 14567 -13.47 12605
3 CENTRAL 27229 -28.89 19363 -19.35 15616 -12.99 13587
4 CLARK/FULTON 27912 -17.55 23013 -10.57 20580 -15.24 1744113
5 CORLETT 21034 -11.95 18521 -9.22 16813 -12.19 '14764
6 CUDELL 13408 -15.31 11355 -9.20 10310 -14.52 8813
7 DETROIT SHOREWAY/NEA 29891 -30.61 20741 -18.08 16992 -16.85 14128
8 DOWNTOWN 3761 27.60 4799 6.67 5119 59.02 8140
9 EDGEWATER 10772 -10.62 9628 .-3.93 9250 -8.80 81436
10 EUCLID/GREEN 9185 -12.98 7993 -10.30 7170 -13.15 6227
*11 [AIRFAX 22157 -42.02 12847 -14.19 11024 -14.86 9386
12 'ORLST IlULLS 30857 --29.09 21881 -17.09 18142 -16.86 15084
13 GLfNVILE - ' - 47842 - -16.57 30348 -17.20 25128 -16.86 20892
*14 HOUGH 45487 -44.31 25330 -17.49 20899 -11.73 18447
15 INDUSTRIAL VALLEY 1498 -60.81 587 -23.00 452 -16.81 376
16 JEFFERSON 25633 -15.56 21644 -6.97 20136 -6.76 18775
17 KAM14S CORNER 26570 -14.89 22614 -7.40 20940 -11.70 18490
18 KINSMAN 15361 -43.45 8686 -23.24 6667 -16.87 5542
19 LE./MILES 21951 -12. 41 19226 -8.47 17598 -12.85 15336
H 20 MT. PLEASANT 33613 -17.68 27671 -12.19 24297 -16.86 20200
21 NORTH BROADWAY 13424 -28.28 9628 -9.82 8683 -14.08 7460
22 NORMil COLLINWOOD 22439 -7.78 20693 -6.89 19268 -9.21 17493
23 01110 CIIY/NEAR WEST 20324 -34.01 13412 -17.80 11025 -6.06 10357
24 OLD BROOKLYN 43239 -13.93 37217 -6.48 34806 -6.51 32540
25 GOODRICHI/KIRTLAND PA 8719 -34.20 5737 -3.83 5517 -7.52 5102
26 PURITAS/LONGMEAD 20622 -14.92 17546 -6.87 16341 -6.52 15275
27 RIVERSIDE 10805 -26.23 7971 -6.80 7429 -12.28 6517
28 ST. CLAIR/SUPERIOR 21910 -32.05 14888 -13.47 12883 -16.34 10778
29 SOUTH BROADWAY 31800 -25.57 23668 -7.02 22007 -9.66 19881
30 SOUTH COLLINWOOD 22359 -19.33 18038 -14.21 15475 -15.10 13138
31 TREMONT 16322 -37.05 10275 -22.16 7998 -16.84 6651
32 UNION/MILES PARK 23214 -16.86 19299 -15.18 16369 -14.91 13928
33 UNIVERSITY 12804 -23.69 9771 -18.014 8008 -6.37 7498
34 WEST BOULEVARD 21964 -17.26 18173 -5.73 17131 -6.53 16013
35 WOODLAND IIILLS 14676 -4.48 14019 -17.74 11532 -16.87 9587
Source: City of Cleveland
Executive Summary Population
Trends
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o 200 400 *oo 
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Source: Doan Center, Inc.
S E CT ON 1. -4
LEVELOPMET" 3CGET SUWMARY
BY 00CJECT CCM T'"
PR OJECT CCMPChJEITTS
Component 1:
Component II:
Component II:
o 350 Room Hotel
o 175,000 s.f. retail complex (2 levels)
(120,000 s.f. G.L.A.)
o 140,000 s.f. office space above
retail (120,000 s.f. G.L.A.)
o 40,000 s.f. conference center
o 800 car parking garage
o 350 car parking garage
o Public Improvements
o Land acquisition
o Long term acquisition and Clinic
expansion
o Public Improvements and demolition
o Potential rehab activity for low cost,
long term transient housing and day
care facility
o Woman's Hospital parking
Phase I
o 346 units, new construction housing
(70 units/acre) (208 midrise, 138
townhouses)
o 90 units, 1 bedroom rehab
o 428 cars structured parking
o 116 cars surface parking (with
foundation)
o Woodruff Rospital Park
Phase II
o 156 units new construction (mid-rise) &
47 units new construction (townhouses)
o 195 car parking garage above surface
parking
o Public Improvements
Developren-
Cost-
S32,950,000
23,925,000
14,700,000
4,500,000
6,600,000
2,750,000
1,000,.000
6,800,000
$93,225, CC
0*
$ 625,000
0*
0*
S 625,000
S24, 390,000
2,325,000
3,000,000
532,000
0*
$32, 247,000
$17,200,000
1,570,000
600,000
S19, 37 , CC
* T-ese are considered institutional project costs not to
be borne by projects
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EXHIBIT K-2
Source:
Doan Center, Inc.
PROJECT COM PONF1TS
Comnonent : AlIter-ative 1: Fehabilitation :ocus
o John jav H-igh School adaptive reuse
0
0
0
0
0
0
105 units
130 car parking deck
500 units mid & hich-rise units
600 car parking deck
2.6- acre. park
Tudor Arms rehab 110 units
Surface parking 137 cars
Alternative 2: Intearated Focus
o 170 units high rise
o 212 car parking deck
o. 500 units mid & high rise units
o 600 car parking deck
o Tudor Arms rehab 110 units
o Surface parking 137 cars
o John Hay High School adaptive reuse
105 units
o 130 car parking deck
o 2.6 acre park and 0.6 acre park
Alternative 3: Pedevelopment Focus
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Component V:
170 high rise units
170 mid rise units
424 parking spaces
500 units mid & high rise units
600 car parking deck
Tudor Arms rehab - 110 units
Surface parking - 137 cars
o 200 units elderly housing near
Play House
o 10,000 s.f. retail rehabilitation
0
0
0
Component VI:
(Cedar)
Park 1/2 acre
12,000 s.f. retail
30 surface car spaces
o 80,000 s.f. convenience retail,
center and 350 car surface parking
0
0
0
Symbolic entrv - 1 acre
Church Park - 30,000 scuare feet
Land acquisition & relocation
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Development
Cost
S 7,350,000
1,250,000
48,000,000
5,750,000
395,000
5,800,000
200,000
$68,745,000
$16,850,000
2,000,000
48,000,000
5,750,000
5,800,000
200,000
7,350,000
1,256,000
485,000
$87,685,000
S16,850,000
16,850,000
4,000,000
48,000,000
5,750,000
5,800,000
200,000
S97,450,000
Sll,400,000
780,000
336,000
975,000
164,000
$13,655,000
S 6,500,000
330,000
.100, 000
895,000
S 7,325,000
EXHIBIT K-2
(cont' d)
PROJECT CCMPC1ETS
Ccrnonent V7: o 343 mixed income townhouse i
o 128 garages
o 215 structured parkinc spaces
o Land acquisition and relocation
Develocment
-Cost
S17,125,CCC
1, 165,00C
1, 635, 000
3,615,000
$23,540,000
Comoonent VIII:o Housing rehab area (Not in project budget)
TOTAL $257,242,000-S285,947,000
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(cont ' d)
Fact Sheet
DOAN CENTER INCORPORATED ORGANIZATION
DCI was incorporated as a 501(c)3 non-profit corporation
on July 1, 1984. It is a membership organization com-
prised of institutional members and their designees to
the Board. The trustees and their affiliation are as
follows:
John M. Baker, Esq.
Lowell F. Bernard
Dr. James A. Block
William E. Conway
David G. Hill, Esq.
Dr. William S. Kiser
-G. Robert Klein
Joseph D. Pigott
David V. Ragone
Robert J. Shakno
Herbert E. Strawbridge
Richard B. Tullis
The Ohio College of Podiatric Medicine
Cleveland Health Education Museum
University Hospitals of Cleveland
Ex Officio
Operation Alert
The Cleveland Clinic Foundation
The Cleveland Play House
University Circle Incorporated
Case Western Reserve University
Mt. Sinai Medical Center of Cleveland
Ex Officio
Ex Officio
1986-87 OFFICERS
Chairman
Vice Chairman
President
Vice President
Treasurer
Secretary
Asst. Corp. Secretary
Herbert E. Strawbridge
William E. Conway
Kenneth W. McGovern
Michael J. May
Kenneth J. Pinkerton
David N. Goss
Marvelous Ray Baker
EXHIBIT L
Source:
Doan Center, Inc.
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H. HOUSING MARKET INFORMATION
Since 1980, several extensive studies have been undertaken
to determine the market feasibility of developing market-rate
housing in the Doan Center/Cleveland Clinic area. All have found
the area's major medical, educational, and cultural institutions
expressing a strong Oesire and need for expanded long-term living
opportunities for the 30,000+ employees and the millions of
yearly visitors who frequent the area. New markets have been
emerging for both rental and sales housing units due largely to
recent expansion and improvement programs by these institutions
which have resulted in steady area employment growth and vastly
improved physical conditions in the Doan Center environment.
Noticeable change has been seen in the community's perception of
safety, services, etc., as well.
The Doan Center/University Circle area continues to be one
of Cleveland's strongest sectors of vitality and growth as
witnessed by the following institutional expansion projects:
o The Cleveland Clinic Foundation is nearing completion
of its SS5 million expansion program, which, with its
new keystone out-patient facility designed by Cesar
Peli, is drastically changing the face of the Doan
Center area.
o The new W. 0. Walker Rehabilitation Complex, estimated
at $60 million, is now beginning construction at East
105th Street and Euclid Avenue, providing 300 new jobs
to Doan Center.
o The new Cleveland Play House complex, designed by
native son Phillip Johnson, at East 86th Street was
just completed at a cost of $7 million.
o University Hospitals of Cleveland is nearing completion
of the construction of its $30 million Health Center
complex at Abington Road.
o The Mt. Sinai Medical Center has added a new $59
million surqical wing and entrance.
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o Case Western Reserve University continues its program-
of extensive renovation of existing facilities
including engineering and medical laboratories,
Adelberht Hall and Guilford House.
o The Western Reserve Historical Society recently opened
its new library on Magnolia Drive at a cost of $4
million.
o The Cleveland Museum of Art has conpleted nine new
galleries and a two-story library at a cost of $4
million.
o The Cleveland Institute of Art has creatively reused
the former Ford Auto Assembly Plant on Euclid Avenue
for arts programs and commercial uses, also at a cost
of $4 million.
The above activity totals an estimated $400 million in
committed captial investment which has made the area a major
focal point in the city's overall rebuilding effort.
Several housing projects are underway or being proposed by
local housing developers mainly as a result of the above
activity. These include the following projects which represent
the first new conventional housing constructed on Cleveland's
near east side in 50 years:
o Conversion of the former Otis Mansion on Magnolia Drive
in nearby University Circle has been completed by the
Magnolia Park Development Company. Within this 8,000
sq. ft. mansion and carriage house, four new condomi-
nium units have been created, with prices ranging from
$97,000 to $158,000. Two have been sold and plans are
underway to convert more mansions on Magnolia Drive.
o The Keyes-Treuhaft Company will break ground next month
for the contruction of 16 new $100,000 condominium
units on Bellflower Road in University Circle. The
design of the multi-unit facility will closely resemble
the architectural scale and features fo the large
mansions in that area.
o Proposals are being received for the large-scale, mixed-
use development of the "Triangle" site at the intersec-
tion of Mayfield Road and Euclid Avenue. The market-
rate housing and retail portions of the project are
presently being reviewed by University Circle, Inc.,
Case Western Resrve University, University Hospitals,
and the City to judge physical design and financial
benefits to the area.
o Construction has begun in the conversion by Steven
Bucharri, Inc. of the vacant Murray Hill High School
(on Murray Hill Road near University Circle) to retail,
office space and 40 condominium units.
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o Construction is underway on the 183-unit, first phase
of Lexington Village at East 79th Street and Hough
Avenue, just north of Doan Center. This apartment
complex is being co-developed by McCormack, Baron
& Associates of St. Louis and the Famicos Foundation.
Several major housing market studies have been commissioned
in the last five years by groups associated with the Doan Center
area including University Circle, Inc., the Cleveland Clinic
Foundation, Hough Area Development Corporation and the Doan
Center Task Force. All have had positive findings with regard to
employees' and visitors' desire to live in the area, as well as
their ability to pay market rates for new housing. Copies of
these studies are included in the prospectus.
The most recent analysis prepared for housing in Doan Center
was completed in March of 1984 by Halcyon Ltd. of Hartford,
Connecticut. This study identified potential market demand for
2,600 newly built housing units over a ten-year period within the
Doan Center Development District.
Of this total existing demand, approximately 1,850 house-
holds are expected to consist of Doan Center area employees,
resulting from the steady employment growth and new employees
and gradual movement of present employees back to the Doan area
where they work. The demand for the additonal 750 units is
expected to come from a small percentage of the households that
would normally locate in Cleveland Heights or on the East Side of
Cleveland. A summary of Halcyon's main findings about the Doan
Center residential market area is as follows:
o Although the overall number of households in Cuyahoga
County is projected to decline through 1995, the number
of households headed by persons aged 35-44 is
projected to increase by 12.1% between 1980 and 1995.
o The Doan Center employment base is exceptionally
strong; overall employment grew by 15.0% between 1977
and 1982, and is expected to increase by 15.3% between
1982 and 1987.
o Incomes of Doan Center area employees indicate that
approximately 85% of these employees could afford to
rent an apartment priced between $450 and $750 or
purchase a unit priced between $45,000 and $75,000. Of
those, 38.6% could afford even more expensive units.
o The 3,009 households which purchased a home in Cleveland
in 1982 had a median income of $23,480. However, the
average sales price of $27,333 indicates that buyers
are settling for less than they can afford because of a
lack of quality homes available or they are buying
homes that require extensive repair.
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o There was an annual average of 715 sales of 1- and 2-
family dwellings in Cleveland Heights between 1979 and
1982. The average price was $61,000 in 1982 and approx-
imately 22% of all homebuyers in that year moved to
Cleveland Heights from the Doan Center/University Circle
area.
o There has been a recent increase in new housing con-
struction in Cleveland Heights and new projects are
now underway in the University Circle area. Developers
that Halcyon interviewed recognized the strong potential
of the Doan Center employment and visitor base for new
rental and condominium housing projects there.
Several internal surveys were conducted in 1983 within
departments of the Cleveland Clinic Foundation in cooperation
with both Halcyon, Ltd. and also Team Four - Economic and Market
Research Consultants of St. Louis, Missouri. Copies of these
studies are included in the prospectus. The major findings of
these efforts were as follows:
o A survey of the Cleveland Clinic Fellows indicated that
66% would consider living in the Doan Center area
subject to the types of units available, the price, and
the condition of the housing and the neighborhood.
Because they are on temporary assignment, the majority
indicated that they would prefer to rent, while 44%
indicated that they could afford a monthly rent between
$400 and $600.
o A survey of Cleveland Clinic Registered Nurses
indicated that 46% would consider living in the Doan
Center area, subject to the types of units available,
the price and the condition of the housing and
neighborhood. Forty-five percent are currently paying
over $400 per month on housing costs or rent.
o A survey of 1,100 CCF non-medical employees who earned
$30,000 or less indicated that 33% of these employees
were interested in renting a townhouse or apartment in
the Lexington Village complex proposed for the Hough
neighborhood despite its relatively isolated location.
The major reasons for this interest were in the
following priority order:
(1) Prefer living closer to their job.
(2) Convenience of Cleveland's cultural.
institutions nearby.
(3) Desire to be part of area revitalization.
(4) Convenience to downtown.
EXHIBIT 0(cont'd)
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CLEVELAND CLINIC
DEVELOPMENT ALTERNATIVE MATRIX
PROPOSED MIXED USE DEVELOPMENT
DEAL STRUCTURE KEY ASSUMPTIONS
ADVANTAGES/
DISADVANTAGES
- Clinitec, Inc. constructs,- Construction manager
secures financing and hired for fee
retains ownership over
project and land.
- Construction and per-
manent financing
through commercial
bank. (Ameritrust)
- Guarantee required for
favorable financing.
- Financing terms:
8.25% annual interest
rate
3 points - loan fees
25 year amortization
10 year call/"balloon"
payment
- Clinitec will need
approximately $1.8
million in equity
- Numerous soft costs
- Clinic Foundation
guarantees or com-
pensating balances will
be necessary to obtain
financing
Clinitec - Wholly
Owned Development
Ground Lease -
Developer Owner
M~
- Clinitec leases land
for 35 years with three
5 year options (sub-
ordinated)
- Developer builds,
operates and obtains
financing
- Property reverts upon
lease expiration
H
- Reputable developer A
engaged
- Ground lease at 5% of his-
torical cost stabilized
- Structure the lease
with upside I of net
operating income -
- Developers fees of 5% D
of total costs -
- Developers overhead est.
at 5% of hard costs -
dvantages:
No management risks
on development
Land ownership
reversion
No financial risk
isadvantages:
Limited control
during lease term
Risk of developer
mismanagement
- Low developer return;
IRR pre-tax - 4.7%
IRR after-tax - 6.2%
Virtually all benefits
passed on to attract a
developer
- Clinitec return from
ground lease rent - .5%
- Upside potential if
property performs over
projections
SOURCE: Laventhol & Horwath
ALTERNATIVE
Advantages: - Pre-tax - 2.7%
- Development may in-
increase the value - After-tax IRR - 4.7%
of other land holdings
- Land appreciation
- Needed retail services
and hotel are provided
- In comparison to the
other development
options, Clinitec re-
tains control of the
the land
- Potential upside benefits
retained by Clinitec, Inc.
Disadvantages:
- Risk of development
cost overruns, etc.
- Responsibility of imple-
mentation and management
- Clinitec, Inc. tax loss/
carry forwards prohibit use of
projects tax benefits
- Additional leverage to
Clinitec, Inc.
RETURNS
H
CLEVELAND CLINIC
DEVELOPMENT ALTERNATIVE MATRIX
PROPOSED MIXED USE DEVELOPMENT (Continued)
ALTERNATIVE
Joint Venture
DEAL STRUCTURE KEY ASSUMPTIONS
- Clinitec contributes
land as equity
- Developer provides
cash equity
- No guarantee of debt
- Developer manages con-
struction & retail, and
leases a operates retail
- Clinitec manages hotel
- Reputable developer
engaged
- Developers fees at
5% of total costs
- Developers overhead
estimated at 5% of
hard costs
- Clinitec obtains
financing
- Cash available split:
Clinitec - 10%
Developer - 90%
- Operating tax losses
split:
Clinic - 01
Developer - 1004
- Clituitec buys out developer
at the end of 25 years to
retain land
- Financing terms:
8.25% annual interest rate
3 points - loan fees
25 year amortization
10 year call/"balloon" payment
ADVANTAGES/
DIADVANTAGES
Advantages:
- No management risk on
development
- Land ownership
reversion
- No cash equity con-
tribution
Disadvantages:
- Limited control during
lease term
- Risk of developer
management
- Debt obligation
with less upside
- Cost of buy back.
RETURNS
- Developer -
Pre-Tax IRR a 10.9%
After-tax IRR - 15.4%
- Clinitec IRR - <11.01>
- Value to Clinitec in
land appreciation
SOURCE: Laventhol A Horwath
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APPENDIX A
NOTE ON SOURCES
This appendix outlines the parties that were interviewed
about the Doan Center project. It also includes a brief
description of those organizations which are not described in
the body of the text. Information for the descriptive
summaries in this appendix comes from interviews and the
organizations' annual reports.
Interviewees
DOAN CENTER INC.:
Kenneth W. McGovern, President
Michael J. May, Vice President
CLEVELAND CLINIC:
David N. Goss, Executive Director
Clinitec, Inc.
CITY OF CLEVELAND:
Robert N. Brown, Project Manager
Cleveland Citywide Plan, City Planning Commission
Gary Conley, Former Director, Economic Development
(now at North Coast Development Development Corporation)
FOUNDATIONS (sponsors of Doan Center, Inc.):
The Cleveland Foundation
Jay Talbot
The George Gund Foundation
Dan Berry, Program Officer
OTHER NONPROFITS:
Cleveland Tomorrow
Richard Shatten, Executive Director
University Circle, Inc.
Brian Gleisser, Vice President for Community Development
Midtown Corridor
Peggy Murphy, Executive Director
NOAH, Neighbors Organized for Action and Housing
Bernard Tompkins, Executive Director
DEVELOPERS
Enterprise Development Corporation
Dixon Harvey, Project Manager
Forest City Dillon
Ed Pelavin, Project Manager
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Appendix A (continued)
DESCRIPTIONS OF ORGANIZATIONS
UNIVERSITY CIRCLE, INC.:
University Circle, Inc. is a nonprofit corporation, with
a large institutional membership of 37 cultural, medical, and
educational facilities. In relation to Doan Center, Inc.,
University Circle, Inc. (UCI) can be seen as the parent
organization. UCI was founded in 1957 to perform landbanking
functions for its member insititutions. The landbank was
seen as a way to avoid speculation and bidding up of land
values in the University Circle area. UCI also prepared a
comprehensive plan for University Circle in an urban renewal
style. That plan was never fully realized, as
non-institutional uses have been able to coexist with their
institutional neighbors. Funding for UCI came from private
individuals, not institutions. As land is needed by member
institutions, UCI sells it to them based on a formula, not a
bid price. Land is now going for $3/SF along Euclid Avenue.
The Cleveland Foundation is a major sponsor of University
Circle, Inc.
In addition to its planning and landbank functions, UCI
also provides service and maintenance functions to its
members. UCI manages a security force, a bus system, and
residential properties in the University Circle area. Its
President is Joseph Pigott and its Chairman of the Board is
Richard Tullis. The Cleveland Clinic Foundation is an
associate member of UCI. There are 25 associate members of
UCI who participate in planning functions for areas beyond
the U.C. police district boundaries. One area of overlap
between UCI and Doan Center is the proposed location of the
Mixed Use Component. Although most of the land in the
proposed site is School Board or city-owned, UCI actually
owns a small parcel. UCI was dubbed a "shadow government" in
a recent newspaper article.
University Circle Inc.'s Vice President for Community
Development, Brian Gleisser, interacts with the professional
staff of Doan Center, Inc. Gleisser is also in the midst of
a private/non-profit partnership for a residential
development called the Mayfield Triangle.
MIDTOWN CORRIDOR
Midtown Corridor was established in 1982 as a nonprofit
coproation formed by business and property owners along the
Euclid Corridor to the west of Doan Center. Its mission is
job retention and creation, physical planning and economic
development. The business sponsors are primarily small
businesses, and Midtown Corridor also strives to be a small
business incubator.
Like University Circle, Inc. Midtown Corridor is also
involved in landbanking. One of its more recent projects Is
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an urban commerce park on 20 acres of land, which the city
assemble and cleared in conjunction with Hough Area
Development Corporation. Peggy Murphy, Midtown's Executive
Director, approached the city with an interest in marketing
the commerce park to local businesses. An interesting
partnership was structured between Midtown, the City's
Economic Development Dept., and the Cleveland Foundation
which provided funding to Midtown. Midtown will ovesee the
marketing, development and project implementation of the 20
acre Midtown Commerce Park. Midtown is able to purchase the
land from the city for $1/SF. Midtown received $800,000 in
funds from the Cleveland Foundation, which was then used to
purchase the land from the city.
Midtown has a very large membership base (approx. 275)
and volunteer support. With a grass roots approach, Midtown
has managed ot improve the visual quality of the environment.
In its short existence, Midtown has set the stage for
substantial reinvestment in one of the City's more
deteriorated areas. [Ken McGovern of DCI is on Midtown's
Board as is Bernard Thompkins of NOAH.]
THE CLEVELAND FOUNDATION:
The Cleveland Foundation was founded in 1914 and was the
first community trust in the country. The Cleveland
Foundation uses funds "to enhance the quality of life for all
citizens of Greater Cleveland." The Cleveland Foundation
sponsors numerous health, human services, cultural and
educational institutions and programs. In its 1986 Annual
Report, the Cleveland Foundation outlined a strategy to focus
its commitments on the Cleveland Public Schools and
neighborhood revitalization, particularly in terms of housing
needs. The Cleveland Foundation's Trustees and Distribution
Committee represents some of Cleveland's most prominent
citizens. The Foundation is extremely well capitalized and
had revenues in 1986 close to $40 million with expenses of
$22.4 million and a fund balance at year's end of $426
million.
The Cleveland Foundation provided funds for Doan Center,
Inc. ($300,000 over 3 years) to undertake the predevelopment
study for the Mixed Use Component. It also sponsors
University Circle Inc, Midtown Corridor, NOAH and Cleveland
Tomorrow.
THE GEORGE GUND FOUNDATION:
The Gund Foundation was established in 1952 by George
Gund, then president of Cleveland Trust Bank (now
Ameritrust). The Gund Foundation's mission states that as a
private non profit institution, it has the, "sole purpose of
contributing to human well-being and the progress of society
in general. Over the years, program objective and emphases
have been modified to meet the changing opportunities and
problems of our society, but the Foundation's basic goal. of
advancing human welfare remains constant."
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The Gund Foundation is particularly committed to
educational, cultural, and neighborhood based development
efforts. Given that all three of these concerns fall into
the University Circle vicinity, the Gund Foundation has been
a supporter of both UCI and DCI. The Gund Foundation is
interested in the potential of the Dual Hub Corridor concept,
and sees the Doan Center as the way to link University Circle
and the Clinic area. The Gund Foundation also funded the
Cleveland Tomorrow study which led to the formation of that
organization.
CLEVELAND TOMMORROW:
Cleveland Tomorrow is yet another non profit corporation
which is involved in Doan Center, perhaps in a less direct
way than those previously discussed. Cleveland Tomorrow is a
nonprofit corporation sponsored by the 44 top corporations
in the city. Cleveland Tomorrow calls on its members not
only for financial support, but also for contributions of
their corporate expertise.
Cleveland Tomorrow (CT) is involved in the city's major
update of its 1949 master plan called Civic Vision. The
organization provided substantive funds for the planning
process and plays and active role in the City's decision
making. Other projects that Cleveland Tomorrow is involved
with are the Domed Stadium proposal, North Coast Development
Corp. (which is planning Cleveland's answer to Baltimore's
Inner Harbor), and The Playhouse Square Foundation.
Cleveland Tomorrow is also very active in neighborhood
development. Two entities are critical to this: Cleveland
Housing Network (CHN) and Cleveland Neighborhood Partnership
Group (CNPG). For the Cleveland Housing Network, CT worked
with Rouse's Enterprise Foundation to set up corporate equity
funding for neighborhood groups involved in housing
development. Corporations are now eligible for tax credits
for investments in low income housing. Nine Neighborhood
Groups participate and have developed 330 units of housing.
The program leases homes to low income families. The
families are responsible for completing the renovation on
their homes which the Network finishes to 85% completion.
After 15 years, the families are eligible for home ownership.
380 units are managed by CHN.
CT is the administrator for CNPG. CT believes
neighborhood based organizations are the best vehicle for
developing housing, but their major obstacle is budgets.
With $1 million in foundation funds, six of the best
neighborhood groups were selected to receive grants in order
to eliminate that obstacle in the next few years. Best is
defined as most promising agenda.
CT has raised $400,000 from its members, but its
operating budget is only $270,000. Members are CEO's of the
40 largest companies in Cleveland. The history of CT is that
it grew out of a 1980 McKinsey study on Cleveland's economic
development funded by the Gund Foundation. CT was formed in
1982 and is loosely modeled after Pittsburgh's Allegheny
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Conference, the Minnesota Business Partnership, NYC
partnership, and Central Atlanta Progress. About 1/3 of
CT's time goes to physical development projects.
CT believes that job creation can be accomplished by
universities, entrepreneurs, and the financial marketplace.
Cleveland Tomorrow began a $13 million venture capital fund,
which has now grown to a $100 million venture capital fund.
Through the universities, it started a Center for Technology
and a Center for Entrepreneurship. Cleveland's physical
development is based more on UDAG's and CDBG's for
neighborhoods. Neighborhood development has been a priority.
Just recently, the city began taking back land cleared but
not used for urban renewal in order to use it.
Richard Shatten, Executive Director, is kept well
informed by Doan Center, Inc. He expects that Doan Center
may seek operating support from Cleveland Tomorrow. He is
now looking into setting up a $30 to $50 million nonprofit
development corporation to take on real estate development
projects like Doan Center. Doan Center may ask for money.
Doan Center needs a loan guarantee for the mixed use project
and an equity investor. Cleveland Tomorrow's Development
Corporation may have more sources of equity and more of a
power base in its leadership, than groups like Doan Center.
NEIGHBORS ORGANIZED FOR ACTION IN HOUSING (NOAH):
To the north and south of Doan Center are Hough and
Fairfax neighborhoods. Both areas have organized groups to
undertake neighborhood revitalization particularly in terms
of improving the housing stock. Two groups in particular
will have a role in neighborhood redevelopment with
implications for Doan Center. These groups are Neighbors
Organized for Action in Housing (NOAH) and New Cleveland-6.
New Cleveland-6, headed by Kenny Lumpkin is based in the
Fairfax area. Both Ken McGovern of DCI and David Goss of the
Cleveland Clinic are on the board of New Cleveland-6. A
partnership between NOAH and New Cleveland-6 was selected to
receive a grant through the Cleveland Neighborhood
Partnership Group administered by Cleveland Tomorrow. NOAH,
perhaps the more established of the two will be the focus of
this section.
NOAH is a nonprofit corporation committed to the
development and management of housing and to address the
problem of a community's physical deterioration in the
neighborhood northwest of the Doan Center project. NOAH now
manages 600 units and is involved with some commercial
projects. Bernard Thompkins is the Executive Director.
NOAH views itself as a business, based on rental income
and management fees. Previously, NOAH could do rehab work
for the tax benefits, but now projects will be done based
more on the pure economics of the deal. Thompkins thinks the
new tax laws will decrease the rate at which real estate
appreciates. Thompkins guessed that DCI has begun dealing
with NOAH because of NOAH's ability to accomplish residential
development.
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